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Contemporary societies face unprecedented environmental challenges one of which is the problem 
of climate change. Global warming caused by the continued emission of greenhouse gases will 
likely have a severe and irreversible impact on societies if substantial action is not taken (IPCC 
2014). Overcoming issues like this calls for radical system-wide changes in unsustainable sectors, 
for example in national systems of energy provision that are based on the exploitation of fossil 
fuels. In the energy sector, these changes would mean cutting down on the excessive reliance on 
fossil fuels in favour of renewable energy such as wind and hydropower, solar and geothermal 
energy and biofuels. However, improvement of unusustainable systems is not just a matter of 
technological development but involves changes in various social phenomena such as regulations 
and policies, consumer practices, supply markets, cultural meanings and values (Geels 2005: 1). 
During the last decade, there has been an increasing amount of studies on such system transitions 
towards sustainability (Markard et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2010). While much of the existing research 
has focused on the breakthrough of new technologies, less attention has been paid to the greening of 
the incumbent industries, i.e. the “flipside” of the emergence of novelty (Turnheim 2012: 1). 
However, there is a need to understand how the destabilisation and reorientation of unsustainable 
industries unfolds because they are often not susceptible to change due to fossil fuel lock-in caused 
by sunk investments, institutional commitments and entrenched practices (Unruh 2000). 
This is the case in Estonia where the principles of national energy provision have remained almost 
the same in spite of major destabilising economic, social and environmental pressures (Holmberg 
2008). The Estonian energy system is still heavily dependent on oil shale as an energy source: about 
85% of electricity is produced from oil shale and the overall share of oil shale in primary energy 
supply is around 75% (Statistikaamet 2016a). Oil shale usage has a large negative impact on the 
environment as producing energy from it emits twice as much greenhouse gases than from 
conventional fossil fuels (Cleveland and O’Connor 2011). Largely due to the impact of the oil shale 
industry, Estonia has one of the biggest ecological footprints per capita in Europe (Global Footprint 
Network 2016). At the same time, the Energy Return on Investment (EROI) for shale oil is 
considerably lower than for traditional liquid fuels, with some studies estimating the value to be as 
low as between 1:1 and 2:1 when internal energy is included as an energy cost (Cleveland and 




The aim of this thesis is to explore the impact of climate change and other external pressures on the 
destabilisation of the oil shale industry in Estonia from 1995 to 2016. While previous studies on 
industry destabilisation have found that external pressures tend to lead to the reorientation of the 
incumbent industry towards new markets or the dissolvement of the incumbent industry and the 
breakthrough of new industries, the Estonian case presents a deviant example. The case thus enables 
to explore to what extent the destabilisation of the industry has been influenced by local 
geographical ties which is a topic that has not been studied before. This offers valuable insights for 
improving on existing theory as well as implications for designing policies for sustainable 
development. 
The thesis is structured as follows: in chapter 2, I provide an overview of existing research on 
industry destabilisation and present an original theoretical perspective. Chapter 3 describes the 
research design, data and methods of the case study. Chapter 4 presents the results of the case study 
structured as a narrative. The results are analysed in chapter 5 which also offers implications for 
further research and policy recommendations. The thesis ends with references and technical 
appendices. 
I am very grateful to Laur for sparking my interest in sustainability transitions and pushing me to 
my limits. Most of all, though, I want to thank Kerli for always being there for me and teaching me 




2. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this study is described in this chapter. First, I present a brief overview 
of the most relevant and recent models of industry destabilisation. After that, I move on to some 
shortcomings of the existing models with regard to the research problem of this thesis and offer 
ways to build on existing theory from the literature on the geography of sustanaibility transitions. I 
then present a possible synthesis of the two branches of literature that could help explain the role of 
local geographical context in industry destabilisation. The chapter ends with the research questions 
of this thesis. 
2.1. Industry destabilisation 
2.1.1. Industry regime and external environments 
Recent case studies on industry destabilisation have relied on the same underlying framework called 
the Triple Embeddeness Framework (Geels 2014a). According to this approach, incumbent 
industries operate at the level of “industry regime” which refers to the “set of industry-specific 
institutions that enable and constrain the behaviour and action of industry actors” (Turnheim 2012: 
52-53). Industry regimes consist of: 
 functional-cognitive elements such as technical knowledge and capabilities; 
 cultural-cognitive elements such as industry mindsets and cognitive frames; 
 normative elements such as the values, identity and mission of an industry; 
 formal-regulative institutions such as regulations, policies, laws and standards (Geels 2014a: 
266-267). 
The firms-in-industries are embedded threefold in the industry regime as well as two external 
environments (figure 1). As for the external environments, firms-in-industries face pressures from 
the economic environment which involve suppliers as well as users and consumers. Alternatively, 
the economic environment might be conceptualised as a “task” environment that includes 
organisations and actors that are in direct commercial transactions with the industry and thus form a 
“closer layer” (Suarez and Oliva 2005: 1019). However, firms-in-industries also have to deal with 
broader pressures from the socio-political environment which involves policymakers as well as the 
civil society. This constitutes a more general, institutional layer to the industry because the mutual 




Figure 1. Industry regimes and external environments (Geels 2014a: 266). 
From these environments, different kinds of pressures may emerge that contribute to the 
destabilisations of industry regimes: 
economic pressures 
 generating from changing demand such as the shrinking market size and demand due to 
technological competition in products; 
 generating from changing supply such as the availability of resources for production, 
process innovation and technological competition in products; 
socio-political pressures 
 generating from civil society such as changes in societal beliefs and public discourse and 
normative contestation by protest groups and specialized activist organisations; 
 generating from policymakers such as changes in policies regulating and supporting 
industries (Turnheim 2012: 56-57). 
The common regime elements provide stability to the firms in the industry and protect them from 
external pressures. Industry destabilisation can therefore be described as the process of weakening 
reproduction of core regime elements (Turnheim and Geels 2012: 35). For example, destabilisation 
occurs when firms in the industry make substantial changes in their production technologies or their 
mission and identity. 
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2.1.2. Stage-models of industry destabilisation 
For conceptualising the unfolding of industry destabilisation, Turnheim (2012: 60-63) has 
developed an ideal-typical heuristic stage-model of problem unfolding and subsequent strategic 
responses by the industry that consists of five stages: 
1. as problems emerge, industry actors fail to pay adequate attention to the problem and 
downplay or deny the issue. Commitment to the regime remains strong and “business as 
usual” continues; 
2. as problems can no longer be denied, industry actors start to implement small changes such 
as tighter controls, domain defence, incremental innovations or early diversification; 
3. when problems increase, industry actors delve into exploration and diversification while 
beginning to doubt the viability of the regime; 
4. as the crisis becomes urgent, industries descend into full destabilisation and decline. This 
can lead into 
a. re-orientation: substantial change in peripheral rules (technical and knowledge base, 
regulations) i.e. finding new means for doing things or 
b. re-creation: radical change in the identity, mission and values i.e. defining new ways 
of being. 
5. the failure to address cumulating pressure is followed by dissolution and collapse while the 
industry actors resort to downsizing and “milking” the assets. 
While Turnheim’s stage-model focuses more on the internal dynamics of the industry regime, 
Penna and Geels (2012, 2015) have developed the Dialectic Issue Lifecycle Model (DILC) that 
accounts more in-depth for the interplay between the regime and the external environments. The 
DILC describes the actions of different groups of industry-external actors in each stage, including 
1) activists and social movements, 2) policymakers and 3) consumers and suppliers (Penna and 
Geels 2015: 1031-1032). The unfolding of destabilisation follows a similar logic to the previous 
model: 
1. the issue is first framed by social activists while industry actors fail to recognise it or 
downplay its importance; 
2. social movements are formed that push the issue on the public agenda and give rise to public 
concerns. Industry actors engage in defensive responses such as “closed industry fronts” 
while exploring incremental technological solutions; 
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3. policymakers feel the pressure to become involved, creating investigative committees and 
organising public debates. Industry actors bring up reasons why radical change is 
unnecessary or impossible. They promise to implement incremental solutions while secretly 
hedging into radical alternatives or diversifying into new product markets; 
4. new substantial legislation is introduced and implemented by policymakers. Industry actors 
contest the new policies while increasing investment in R&D. A new market share emerges 
as “moral consumers” adopt early radical alternatives; 
5. changes in policies, consumer preferences or public discourse bring about the rise of new 
markets. Some industrial actors see this as an opportunity to reorient towards new markets 
while also recreating themselves with a new identity and mission related to addressing the 
issue at stake. 
2.2. Shortcomings of existing models 
2.2.1. Nonlinear sequence of destabilisation stages 
Although the existing models make a valuable contribution to the research into industry 
destabilisation, they share some aspects that could benefit from further theoretical development. 
First, while both models suggest an ideal-typical linear sequence of phases and events, the authors 
acknowledge that in reality these processes unfold in much more complex patterns. One of the main 
conclusions of the previous case studies is that empirically, the issue lifecycles usually exhibit a 
“cyclical” path where the external pressures and industry responses move not in a linear fashion but 
forwards and backwards through phases (Geels and Penna 2015: 81; Penna and Geels 2012: 1018; 
Turnheim 2012: 1766). However, the existing DILC model does not explain the reasons why the 
issue lifecycle might return to earlier phases. Geels and Penna (2015: 81) claim that this is 
something that could be explored in further research, proposing that the reasons might include 1) 
ups and downs in problem-related pressure, 2) successful industry fight-back, 3) changing macro-
level (landscape) contexts and 4) paradigmatic change in the problem framing. In addition, 
Turnheim (2012: 317-318) suggests that 1) political intervention (or the lack of it) and 2) multi-
level embeddedness of industries might be crucial in explaining the unfolding of the phases in 
industry destabilisation. Geels (2014b: 26-27) also suggests that industry actors tend to have a big 
influence on policy by forming close alliances with policymakers. 
2.2.2. Geographical variation in destabilisation 
Secondly, with regard to research into sociotechnical transitions in general, there has recently been 
a rising attention to the lacking geographical sensitivity (Bridge et al. 2013; Coenen at al. 2012, 
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2015; Coenen and Truffer 2012; Hansen and Coenen 2015; Murphy 2015; Raven et al. 2012; 
Truffer and Coenen 2012; Truffer et al. 2015). There have been mainly two different approaches to 
incorporating building blocks from geography into transition studies. Some authors have chosen to 
focus on the particular relations on the local and regional level while others have emphasised the 
importance of non-local relations that transcend established geographical boundaries (Hansen and 
Coenen 2015: 100-101). 
In their review of the literature on the geography of socio-technical transitions, Hansen and Coenen 
(2015: 95-100) point to the following place-specific characteristics that might influence transitions: 
 local physical infrastructure. Energy infrastructures can be assessed by several spatial 
features, including the degree of privatisation and the dispersion, connectivity and 
centralisation of the network (Bridge et al. 2013: 336); 
 the visions, priorities and policies of local governments, including the coalitions they form 
with other parties such as industry actors (Geels 2014b: 26-27);  
 informal localised institutions, including entrenched norms, values, practices and cultural 
discourses; 
 local natural resource endowments, including the availability of natural resources as an input 
to energy production but also the social perceptions and cultural meanings of these 
resources, for example, social attachments to natural landscapes which might prevent the use 
of some resources; 
 the role of consumers in local market formation; 
 local technological and industrial specialisation 
The literature on the geography of transitions also holds valuable insights for industry 
destabilisation as the “flipside” of transitions. However, the role of local geographical ties on 
industry destabilisation has not been explored in previous studies. Background knowledge about the 
case of the Estonian oil shale industry suggests that these place-specific factors might be among the 
reasons for the nonlinear unfolding of industry destabilisation. I therefore conclude that there is a 
need for a theoretical framework that would encompass the dimension of local factors in the models 




2.3. Landscape context and local embeddedness of industries 
Several different notions have been used to conceptualise the local geographical aspects of 
transitions. Murphy (2015: 77-81) has used the notion of “landscape context” to refer to the 
structural and subjective/cognitive ways in which sociotechnical regimes are embedded in specific 
places. The notion of “landscape” was initially introduced in transition studies with reference to the 
relatively stable social structure and historical context in which processes of technological change 
are embedded. The notion has been used both in the literal sense, referring to the material 
geographical context, or in the metaphorical sense, referring to the role of culture in sustaining the 
use of certain technologies (Rip and Kemp 1998: 328). As Bridge et al. (2013: 335) note, 
“landscape not only refers to the material features of a particular setting, but also implies the 
cultural evaluations and emotional attachments that people load onto these material forms”. 
Alternatively, Truffer and Coenen (2012: 9-11) have suggested that industry regimes enjoy various 
territorial, social and cultural advantages that arise from the “socio-spatial embeddedness” in the 
geographical context. Similarly, Bridge et al (2013: 336) make the claim that “how new energy 
technologies spread across space often depends on how these technologies (and the natural 
resources upon which they are deployed) are embedded in (national) systems of signification and 
cultural routines”. The notion of “embeddedness” was originally introduced in economic sociology 
and economic geography to refer to the ways in which economic action is constrained by wider 
social relations and material structures (Granovetter 1985). In his critical review of the concept, 
Hess (2004: 176-177) has distinguished between three main types of embeddedness: 
 societal embeddedness: the influence that the social and cultural background of the actors 
has on their action; 
 network embeddedness: the involvement of the actor in a social network, i.e. a structure of 
relationships among a set of actors regardless of their local anchoring in particular places; 
 territorial embeddedness: the extent to which an actor is “anchored” in particular territories 
or places. 
I propose that Hess’s framework is a useful tool for analysing the local embeddedness of industries 
because it is broad enough to encompass all the main place-specific factors: 
 local physical infrastructure is a form of territorial embeddedness; 
 the visions, priorities and policies of the local government, including the coalitions they 
form with other parties, e.g. industry actors might be forms of societal as well as network 
embeddedness;  
 informal localised institutions are a form of societal embeddedness; 
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 local natural resource endowments are a form of territorial embeddedness while social 
attachments to natural landscapes are a form of territorial as well as societal embeddedness; 
 the role of consumers in local market formation and local technological and industrial 
specialisation are forms of societal as well as network embeddedness. 
It is also evident that the place-specific factors covered by the notion of embeddedness overlap with 
what is meant by the notion of landscape context (local material, social and cultural structures). I 
thus conclude that Hess’s framework of embeddedness is a useful all-encompassing tool for 
analysing the geographical aspects that may influence the unfolding of industry destabilisation.  
2.4. Industry destabilisation and local embeddedness: two mechanisms 
at play 
Building on the two branches of literature, I propose that industry destabilisation can be 
concpetualised as a combination of two separate mechanisms where external pressures clash with 
the local embeddedness of the industry. I now present these two mechanisms and explain their 
relevance for explaining the particular case. 
According to the first mechanism (table 1), external pressures emerge from 1) the framing of a 
problem by activists and 2) organization into movements and raising public concerns. Organized 
political lobbying might lead to 3) early political debates and discussions. Subsequently, 4) the 
growth of the alternative market niches and the implementation of new substantive policies is likely 
to result in 5) changes in economic frame conditions. Accordingly, industry actors respond by 1) 
denying or downplaying the problem and 2) defending their domain by organizing into closed 
fronts. They are likely to introduce incremental changes while 3) portraying radical solutions as 
unfeasible. However, they might secretly hedge by investing into alternatives. New substantive 
policies are likely to be 4) opposed while searching for ways of diversifying into new markets. 
When problems become insurmountable, industry actors either 5) reorient towards new markets, re-
create themselves or dissolve. 
Table 1. Mechanism of external pressures and industry destabilisation. 
Phases 
External pressures 





Phase 1 problem framing  
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1) re-orientation or 
 2) re-creation or 
3) dissolution 
With regard to the second mechanism (table 2), there are three main forms of local embeddedness 
of industries. Firstly, industries can be societally embedded which means that industry actors are 
influenced in their action by their societal, cultural and political background. Secondly, they may be 
territorially embedded which means that industry actors become constrained by the 
material/physical, economic and social conditions that already exist in particular places. Thirdly, 
they might exhibit network embeddedness which means that industry actors develop trusting 
relationships with policymakers that mutually influence their strategies and actions. 
Table 2. Mechanism of local embeddedness of industries. 
Dimension of 
embeddedness 
Entities and activities 
societal 
industry actors are influenced in their action by their societal, cultural 
and political background  
network 
industry actors develop mutual trusting relationships with 
policymakers 
territorial 
industry actors become constrained by the material/physical, economic 
and social conditions that already exist in particular places 
Following these models, I hypothesise that the impact of external pressures on the destabilisation of 
the industry is altered and/or neutralized by local embeddedness. This hypothesis forms the basis of 
the research questions. The case study on the destabilisation of the Estonian oil shale industry is 






2.5. Research questions 
Based on the research problem and the theoretical framework, the aim of this thesis is to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. In what ways is the Estonian oil shale industry embedded in the local landscape? 
2. What is the combined effect of external pressures and local embeddedness on the 
destabilisation of the Estonian oil shale industry from 1995 to 2016? 
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3. Research design, data and methods 
3.1. Research design 
3.1.1. Case study 
This thesis will focus on the impact of climate change on the destabilisation of the Estonian oil 
shale industry in the period 1995-2016. As this is a complex process unfolding over a long period of 
time, the research will follow the longitudinal case study design. According to Yin (2003: 13-14), a 
case study is an empirical inquiry that 1) investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, 2) 
relies on multiple sources of evidence and 3) benefits from prior theory development to guide data 
collection and analysis. A longitudinal case study also involves a temporal perspective by studying 
the same case over an extended period of time (Yin 2003: 42). The case study design is useful for 
identifying operational links needing to be traced over time and enables to deal with a full variety of 
evidential sources beyond what is possible in conventional historical research (Yin 2003: 6-8). 
3.1.2. Estonian energy system and the oil shale industry 
The Estonian energy system is heavily dependent on oil shale as an energy source. About 85% of 
electricity is produced from oil shale and the overall share of oil shale in primary energy supply is 
around 75% as depicted on figure 3 (Energiatalgud 2016; Statistikaamet 2016a). Another distinctive 
aspect of the energy system is the degree of centralization, both in political and geographical terms. 
The main energy supplier is the state-owned Eesti Energia which provides over 90% of the 
electricity produced in Estonia (Eesti Energia 2017). In addition, the main power plants in Estonia 
are all situated in the north-eastern 
part of the country near the Russian 
border (figure 2). Of the three of the 
biggest power plants in Estonia, the 
Eesti and Balti power plants are 
situated in or around the city of 
Narva while the new Auvere power 
plant lies in the village of Auvere 
about 20 km to the west.  





Figure 3. Primary energy supply in Estonia from 1991 to 2015 (Statistikaamet 2016a). 
The oil shale industry, however, is not limited to the energy sector. As depicted on figure 4, there 
are several others uses for oil shale in addition to power generation. Oil shale is used for the 
production of shale oil and other fuels as well as chemical products. Building materials such as 
blocks and cement are made from the by-products of oil and power generation.  




























































































































Accordingly, the companies in the oil shale industry are not occupied in the energy business only 
and most of them have several subsidiaries in different sectors (table 3). While Eesti Energia is the 
main energy supplier, its other activities include oil production, the development of new 
technologies, network maintenance and supply and mining. The fields of activity of the Viru 
Keemia Grupp (VKG, formerly Kiviter) are similarly diverse, including the production of oil and 
chemicals, mining, logistics, network maintenance and supply and the repair and assembly of 
technological equipment. In 2016, one of the subsidiaries of VKG was sold to a foreign company 
and subsequently renamed to Roclite OÜ. The company uses spent shale to produce building 
blocks. Among the companies in the oil shale industry are also Kiviõli Keemiatööstus (formerly a 
subsidiary of Kiviter) which is in the oil and energy business and Kunda Nordic Tsement which 
produces cement from spent shale. With regard to geographical locations, it is appropriate to point 
out again that nearly all of the production facilities of all the companies are situated in the Ida-
Virumaa region.  
Table 3. Companies in the oil shale industry. 
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3.1.3. Case selection 
The case has been selected because it is a deviant case (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 302). A case is 
deviant if, by reference to a general theoretical understanding, it demonstrates a surprising and 
anomalous value. In other words, a deviant case is one for which the existing theoretical model or 
causal mechanism does not offer a sufficient explanation. The reason for studying deviant cases is 
that they help to uncover new causal factors or mechanisms and develop alternative explanations. 
Seawright (2016: 86-87) even goes as far as to say that deviant cases are the most useful cases to 
choose for case study analysis precisely because they enable to find omitted variables and 
mechanisms and discover unknown causal pathways. Choosing a deviant case allows me to explore 
whether there is a previously unknown causal mechanism influencing the outcome of the process 
and thus build on existing theories of industry destabilisation. 
In order to understand in which way the case of the Estonian oil shale industry is deviant, let’s 
consider the following: 
1. first of all, climate change constitutes a strong globally perceived pressure with wide-
ranging implications on the environment and the conventional lifestyles of citizens of 
Western societies. It was acknowledged as a serious threat by policymakers in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2014). By 
ratifying the Kyoto protocol in 2002 and joining the EU in 2004, Estonia too has agreed to 
take action against climate change. The issue has subsequently entered the public agenda 
due to increasing coverage by news media outlets (figure 5) which has also influenced 
public opinion, with climate change being perceived by Estonians as the second biggest 
global environmental concern (Turu-uuringute AS 2010: 8); 
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2. furthermore, the world has seen a remarkable growth in the installation of renewable energy 
technologies such as wind turbines and solar panels in the past few years (IEA 2016). 
Renewable power generation is becoming more cost-effective rapidly and can already 
compete with fossil fuels without financial support where good resources and cost structures 
exist, especially if we include the externalities of fossil fuel usage on the environment and 
on people’s health (Amin 2015: 9-11). Delucchi and Jacobson (2011) suggest that it would 
be technologically and economically possible to generate all global energy from renewables 
by 2030 and that the obstacles that remain are mainly social and political. According to the 
Estonian Renewable Energy Association, a transition to 100% renewable energy use for 
Estonia by 2030 would also be both technologically possible and economically beneficial 
(Eesti Taastuvenergia Koda 2011); 
3. the resilience of the incumbent regime to external pressures is low because oil shale is a 
relatively sub-optimal source for energy production. The Energy Return on Investment 
(EROI) for shale oil is considerably lower than for traditional liquid fuels, with some studies 
estimating the value to be as low as between 1:1 and 2:1 when internal energy is included as 
an energy cost (Cleveland and O’Connor 2011: 2319; Hall et al. 2014: 143). At the same 
time, oil shale usage has a larger negative impact on the environment as producing energy 
from it emits twice as much greenhouse gases than from conventional fossil fuels 
(Cleveland and O’Connor 2011: 2313). Largely due to the impact of the oil shale industry, 
Estonia has one of the biggest ecological footprints per capita in Europe (Global Footprint 
Network 2016); 
4. considering the extent of the external pressures and the low resilience of the regime, we 
should be seeing a substantial reorientation of the incumbent regime or a successful 
transition towards a sustainable energy system. However, in reality the pressures on the 
Estonian oil shale industry have only led to incremental change in the national energy 
system over the years, with 75% of primary energy still being produced from oil shale 
(figure 3). As for renewables, the most used energy source is wood (mainly wood chips and 
pellets) which also has a relatively low EROI and is being processed in the same power 
plants as oil shale. Despite the ambitious scenarios proposed by the Estonian Renewable 
Energy Association, the latest National Development Plan of the Energy Sector foresees 
only a modest rise in the share of renewables, with 28% of primary energy consumption and 





In conducting the longitudinal case study, I will rely on process-tracing as “the most important tool 
of causal inference in qualitative and case study research” (Mahoney 2012: 571). Process-tracing 
involves identifying causal mechanisms between an observed cause (in this case climate change) 
and outcome (in this case industry destabilisation) of a process (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 1). A 
causal mechanism can be defined roughly as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the 
interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 1996: 52). Every part of a causal mechanism should 
consist of 1) some entities (e.g. policymakers) and 2) the activities that they undertake (e.g. 
introducing and implementing legislation) (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 14; Hedström and Ylikoski 
2010: 51). 
Process analysis is fundamentally different from the more conventional way of studying social 
change which has been called the “variance approach” (Langley 1999; Poole 2004; Van de Ven and 
Engleman 2004). While variance analysis explains change in terms of relationships between 
dependent and independent variables by means of statistical models, process analysis focuses on the 
sequence of events and the patterns among them that connect causes to an outcome. Process 
analysis thus enables the researcher to look into the “black box” between causes and outcomes and 
provide a more thorough explanation of social change. 
Three different variants of process-tracing can be distinguished: theory-testing, theory-building and 
explaining-outcome analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 13-22). In this case study, I will rely on 
explaining-outcome process-tracing because I am interested in explaining the observed outcome (or 
the lack of one) in this particular case. The question I seek to answer is thus the following: why is it 
that the extensive external pressures have not led to a full destabilisation of the industry? 
Explaining-outcome process-tracing is a research strategy that resembles abduction which is a 
combination of deduction and induction (figure 4). The deductive part consists of deducing a 
theoretical causal mechanism from the existing literature and testing to what extent it can account 
for the observed outcome. However, for deviant cases the existing mechanism is usually unable to 
explain the full extent of the outcome. The inductive strategy is then used to gather additional 
empirical evidence and build a more comprehensive explanation. It could be the case that the 
observed outcome is caused by multiple causes or causal mechanisms in which case explaining-
outcome process-tracing is the most suitable strategy for uncovering these previously unknown 




Figure 4. Explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 20). 
It is reasonable to assume that “in the complex social world, most outcomes are the product of 
multiple mechanisms acting at the same time” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 89). I will thus first 
assume that the Estonian case follows the ideal-typical model of industry destabilisation which is 
depicted as a five-phase process between external pressures and industry responses (table 1). In the 
deductive part of explaining-outcome process-tracing, I will test the empirical evidence against the 
model of industry destabilisation to see to what extent the case follows the model. This deductive, 
theory-testing part of the analysis will be followed by inductive process-tracing in which I will 
gather additional empirical evidence to explain the anomalies in the outcome of the process. In 
doing that, I will focus on the place-specific factors related to the local embeddedness of the 
industry that may have hindered the unfolding of industry destabilisation and negated the effect of 
the first mechanism. Building on Hess (2004: 176-178), I presume that industry actors 1) may have 
been influenced by their societal, cultural and political background, 2) may have developed mutual 
trusting relationships with policymakers and 3) may have become constrained by their material, 
economic and social surroundings (table 2). Since this is an exploratory part of the research I will 
make no further specific predictions about this mechanism. 
The underlying assumption here is that the anomalies in the outcome of the process are caused by 
the two mechanisms at play here working in opposite ways and neutralizing each other’s effect. 
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Identifying the specific ways in which the mechanism of local embeddedness works could thus lead 
to improvement in the existing theory on industry destabilisation by pointing to how the local 
embeddedness of industries can hinder industry re-orientation and sociotechnical transitions 
towards sustainability. 
3.2. Data 
3.2.1. Types and sources of data 
In process-tracing, data collection is a two-step process that involves 1) gathering raw material data 
and 2) assessing its value and accuracy in the context of the particular case. In that way, empirical 
observations are turned into relevant evidence that can be used to make inferences about the 
presence of the causal mechanism in the particular case (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 73, 120). There 
are four different types of evidence: 
1. pattern evidence which refers to statistical patterns (e.g. fluctuations in statistical indicators); 
2. sequence evidence which refers to the temporal and spatial chronology of events 
hypothesized by the mechanism (e.g. observations that event A occurred before event B); 
3. trace evidence which refers to evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a 
hypothesized mechanism exists (e.g. the existence of the official protocol of a meeting 
provides strong proof that the meeting actually took place); 
4. account evidence which refers to the content of empirical material (e.g. the content of the 
protocol of the meeting which details what was discussed) (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 99-
100). 
Different types of evidence can be collected from different types of sources. Using multiple sources 
of evidence also allows for triangulation which means collecting various types of evidence from 
several independent sources and thus increasing the reliability of the evidence (Beach and Pedersen 
2013: 128). For this case study, I made use of four different sources of data: 
1. the bulk of the research relied on media items found in online newspaper archives. The full 
list of these items is presented in Appendix D; 
2. official public documents were used to gather evidence about the industry regime, activists 
and social movements and policymakers. The documents include 1) annual reports and 
yearbooks of the enterprises in the oil shale industry (Eesti Energia, Viru Keemia Grupp, 
Kunda Nordic Tsement) and the Estonian Renewable Energy Association and 2) strategies 
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and development plans of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Communications of Estonia; 
3. secondary literature was used to find additional evidence about the strategies of 
policymakers and industry actors; 
4. statistical databases and public opinion polls were explored to make use of indicators that 
represent the intensity of climate-change related pressures and debates in the media as well 
as economic supply and demand of shale oil and renewables. The full list of documents, 
secondary literature and statistical databases that were used is presented in Appendix E. 
3.2.2. Data collection 
As for the methods of data collection, newspaper articles about environmental problems related to 
the oil shale industry were collected from the databases of Delfi and Postimees. For this, I 
conducted a Boolean search in the databases of Delfi and Postimees by combining the key words 
(põlevkivi AND kliima) OR (põlevkivi AND keskkon*)1.  After that, I reviewed the results of these 
searches and eliminated articles that were not relevant to the research problem. The 603 articles that 
were used have been listed in Appendix D. These articles were coded according to the coding 
manual in Appendix B. 
Public documents were found on the websites of Eesti Energia, Viru Keemia Grupp, Kunda Nordic 
Tsement, Estonian Renewable Energy Association, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Communications. Statistical information has been collected from the 
databases of Statistics Estonia (Statistikaamet) and Statista. 
3.2.3. Limitations 
There are several advantages to using newspaper items and documents as sources of evidence: 1) 
they are stable and can be reviewed repeatedly, 2) they are objective in the sense that they have not 
been created as a result of the case study, 3) they are exact and detailed and 4) they offer a broad 
coverage of the events (Yin 2003: 86). Furthermore, triangulating qualitative data from documents 
with quantitative statistics adds precision and validity to the evidence.  
However, as with any research design, there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. 
Firstly, the contents of newspaper items and documents have to be critically examined as they might 
reflect the biases of the authors. Secondly, the data collection is inevitably incomplete due to the 
large amounts of newspaper items available although I tried to cover as many relevant items as 
                                                 
1
 (oil shale AND climate) OR (oil shale AND environment) 
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possible over the period of 21 years. The search was conducted in two of the most popular and 
reliable online news portals and was systematic by focusing on the same key words. Thirdly, the 
case study might have benefitted from in-depth elite interviews with selected representatives of the 
categories of actors. The advantage of interviews is that they enable to gain evidence not usually 
available in the content of documents such as “insider” knowledge and information about 
contextual aspects and the motives of actors. However, interviews were not conducted due to 
constraints of time and capacity. 
3.3. Methods 
Although process-tracing is conceived of as a qualitative method, it can also rely on quantitative 
information (Collier 2011: 825). In this case study, I used both quantitative data (pattern evidence) 
and qualitative data (sequence, trace and account evidence). The analysis proceeded in five 
consecutive steps: 1) visual observation of time series data, 2) quantitative content analysis, 3) 
building a narrative of the process, 4) pattern-matching and 5) explaining the outcome. 
3.3.1. Visual observation of time series data 
By the visual observation of time series statistics, I identified overall patterns in the data and 
divided the process into periods according to certain continuities within a set of events and 
discontinuities between them (Langley 1999: 703). This was done following the example of 
previous case studies of this kind (Geels and Penna 2015; Penna and Geels 2015, Turnheim and 
Geels 2012, 2013). According to Geels (2014: 266-267), industries are operating in the economic as 
well as the societal environment and face pressures from both sides. I therefore used the following 
indicators that represented the societal and economic pressure on the industry to measure the 
approximate extent of industry destabilisation: 
1. as the focal problem of this case study is climate change, I used the count of newspaper 
articles covering climate change in the two biggest online news portals in Estonia (Delfi and 
Postimees) from 1995 to 2016 as an indicator of societal pressure. The data was collected 




2. as an indicator of economic pressure, I used the average annual OPEC crude oil price from 
1991 to 2016 to represent fluctuation in supply and demand for shale oil. This indicator was 
chosen because the competitiveness of the oil shale industry depends to a large extent on the 
global crude oil price (Eesti Energia et al. 2016: 23). I also used time series data about the 
                                                 
2
 climate AND warming 
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share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption in Estonia. While this data was 
unfortunately available only for the years 2004 to 2013, it is still useful as it indicates the 
expansion of the renewable energy market niche.  
3.3.2. Quantitative content analysis 
The main part of the case study relies on quantitative content analysis which was carried out on 
newspaper items. According to Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2014: 19), “quantitative content analysis is the 
systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned 
numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving 
those values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its 
meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption”. 
Following Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1281), I used the method of directed content analysis. This 
kind of content analysis is directed in the sense that concepts from existing theory are used as initial 
coding categories that “direct” the coding process. However, the process is not limited to pre-
existing codes only. Data that cannot be coded with the initial categories is coded in an open-ended 
manner (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1282). These codes are later systematized into broader 
categories by means of induction. 
The strength of directed content analysis is that is can be used for both validating and extending the 
existing theory. Moreover, the procedure allows for a comprehensive analysis of existing data as it 
combines both the deductive and the inductive ways of coding. This approach is especially relevant 
for explaining-outcome process-tracing in which the researcher has to use both deductive and 
inductive techniques of analysis. The weakness of directed content analysis is that the researcher 
will approach the data with a theoretical bias and is therefore more likely to find evidence that 
supports the existing theory. Moreover, as the researcher is focused on the existing theory, he or she 
might be blinded to the contextual aspects of the case (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1283). This risk is 
minimized by drawing on prior research as well as allowing for the coding of new contextual 
evidence arising from the data. The coding of the contextual evidence is done without relying on 
existing theory and the categories will be developed mainly in an inductive manner. 
According to the procedures of directed content analysis, the coding in this study was done in two 
parts. The first part of the coding was deductive which means that I was looking for the presence of 
evidence in the data based on the mechanism of industry destabilisation. Appendix A presents the 
operational definitions of the mechanism that formed the basis of the coding categories. The latter 
are presented in Appendix B where the categories B1-B4 refer to the parts of the mechanism by 
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different types of actors. Data that could not be coded with the theory-based categories but was 
identified as relevant was coded in an open-ended manner. These codes were then systematized into 
broader categories by means of induction. In Appendix B, categories C1-C4 include the codes that 
were induced from the data after open coding. The results of the coding in the form of bar graphs 
are presented in Appendix C. 
In addition to these substantial categories, some categories were used for coding more formal 
parameters of the texts such as the date, publisher and headline. An additional category was used to 
identify whose views were mainly presented in the article. This category refers not to the author of 
the text which was usually a journalist but the person or organization who the article was about and 
whose comments made up the bulk of the story. In the case when the article presented the views of 
several different people or groups (for example policymakers, industry representatives and 
environmental activists), all of these were included under this category. The full list of the 
newspaper items along with the formal parameters is presented in Appendix D. The information 
about whose views were presented in the articles is included in Appendix C under the category A4. 
This evidence was later used for explaining the outcome of the process.  
3.3.3. Combining different strategies of process analysis: narratives based on 
temporal bracketing and visual mapping 
In addition to newspaper items, evidence was collected also from documents and secondary 
literature. There were mainly two reasons for using different sources of data: 1) it enabled to collect 
additional evidence that was not found in newspaper items and 2) it allowed for triangulation and 
thus increased the reliability of the evidence. 
Langley (1999) distinguishes between several different but complementary strategies for process 
analysis among which are the narrative strategy, the temporal bracketing strategy and the visual 
mapping strategy. In this case study, a combination of these three strategies was used to build a 
narrative of the process. This approach was chosen because Collier (2011: 828) claims that when 
conducting process-tracing, it is often useful to start with a narrative or a timeline that lists the 
sequence of events. The narrative strategy means that a detailed story was built from the raw data 
collected for the case study. A higher level of systemization of the stories was achieved by the 
temporal bracketing of the process into distinctive periods described in the section 3.3.1. The 
narrative is in part based on the visual graphical representations of the results of the content analysis 
of newspaper items. This kind of visual mapping allows for the simultaneous representation of large 
quantities of information along several different dimensions and is extremely useful for showing 
precedence, parallel processes and the passage of time (Langley 1999: 700). Additional evidence 
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from documents and secondary literature was used to confirm or disconfirm the occurrence and 
sequence of main events in the process identified by the content analysis. The full list of these 
documents, secondary literature and statistical databases is presented in Appendix E. 
The advantage of the narrative strategy is that it is highly accurate, detailed and context-specific 
(Langley 1999: 706). The disadvantages of the narrative approach are balanced by temporal 
bracketing and visual mapping which offer more simplified and systematized explanatory 
overviews and allow for better generalization.  
3.3.4. Pattern-matching and explaining the outcome 
After building the narrative, I used the pattern-matching technique to compare the theoretical 
pattern predicted by the mechanism of industry destabilisation with the actual pattern of observed 
events (Seawright 2016: 177; Yin 2003: 26-27, 116). The aim of this step was to identify to what 
extent the case followed the theoretical mechanism of industry destabilisation and to what extent it 
deviated from it. As the last step, I used the remaining categories of evidence induced from open 
coding to test whether it could account for the deviations from the mechanism of industry 
destabilisaton. On the basis of the existing model and the additional evidence induced from the 
case, I built a more comprehensive explanation of the outcome of the process. This included the 





The results of the analysis are presented in this chapter. Following previous case studies of this kind 
(Geels and Penna 2015; Penna and Geels 2012, 2015; Turnheim and Geels 2012, 2013), I start with 
the periodization of the case by identifying broad patterns in the process by the visual observation 
of time series data. Next, I present a narrative overview of every period along with a list of main 
events by the categories of actors. The narrative relies on 1) the visual mapping of the results of the 
content analysis carried out on online newspaper items and 2) additional supporting evidence 
collected from documents, secondary literature and statistical databases. A temporal bracketing 
strategy based on the previous periodization is used to systematize the narrative into four periods. 
 4.1. Periodization 
4.1.1. Societal pressure 
As an indicator of societal pressure, figure 5 depicts the number of articles on climate change in the 
online databases of Delfi and Postimees from 1995 to 2016. There were several reasons for 
choosing the year 1995 as the starting point. First, 1995 was the year of several significant events 
that helped raise climate change on the public agenda, for example the first annual meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Berlin and the publication of the IPCC Second Assessment 
Report (IPCC 2017; UNFCCC 2014). Secondly, there were no articles on climate change in the 
online databases of Delfi and Postimees before 1995 and only a few per year right after that which 
implies that the media attention to the issue in Estonia was probably quite low before 1995. 


















Figure 5 also includes the most important events that significantly increased or decreased the 
societal attention to climate change throughout the process. The first significant rise occurred in 
1997 with the adoption of the Kyoto protocol, an international treaty regulating the worldwide 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto protocol was ratified by the Estonian 
government in 2002 which led to the next substantial increase in the coverage of climate change. 
After a few years of reduced attention, climate change rose heavily to the public agenda again with 
the release of Al Gore’s documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” in 2005 for which Al Gore, along 
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2007. The coverage of climate change in Delfi and Postimees peaked in 2009 during the 15
th
 
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen which attracted high media attention worldwide but ended 
in failure as world leaders were not able to agree on common objectives. Attention to climate 
change subsequently decreased for several years in a row and increased again only at the end of 
2015 when, at the 21
st
 Conference of Parties in Paris, a global agreement on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation was finally achieved. 
4.1.2. Economic pressure 
As an indicator of economic pressure, figure 6 depicts the average annual OPEC crude oil price 
from 1995 to 2002. This indicator was chosen because the competitiveness of the oil shale industry 
depends to a large extent on the global crude oil price (Eesti Energia et al. 2016: 23).  During that 
time, there have been roughly three major drops in oil price that have had an influence on the oil 
shale industry. These low points occurred in 1998, 2009 and 2015. 
Figure 6. Average annual OPEC crude oil price from 1995 to 2016
3
. 
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 Statista. Average annual OPEC crude oil price from 1960 to 2016. 
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Renewable energy provision may also 
mount significant pressure on the oil shale 
industry. Figure 7 depicts the share of 
renewables in gross final energy 
consumption in Estonia from 2004 to 2013. 
We can see that the consumption on 
renewables rose steadily from 2006 to 2011 
which indicates the formation of a 
renewable energy market niche. This 
period overlaps with the rapid rise of 
climate change onto the political agenda in 
Estonia as well as worldwide. 
Figure 7. Share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
 consumption in Estonia from 2004 to 2013
4
. 
4.1.3. Periods of industry destabilisation 
Based on these three indicators and the background knowledge about the case, I have divided the 
process into four periods based on significant events and continuities within periods and breaks 
between periods. Table 6 gives an overview of the societal and economic pressures and the state of 
industry in each period. The first period from 1995 to 2002 saw climate change being framed as an 
issue for the first time in Estonia, mainly with reference to global events. The industry was troubled 
by low oil prices and the crisis culminated with the bankruptcy of Kiviter and rebirth as VKG. In 
the second period from 2003 to 2009, climate change reached the political agenda mainly due to 
Estonia’s unification with the EU and the subsequent build-up for the COP15 in Copenhagen. The 
industry grew steadily because of high oil prices, experiencing only a minor shock at the end of the 
period due to the global financial crisis. The third period from 2010 to 2013 is characterized by a 
decreasing interest in climate change due to the failure of the parties to reach a global agreement in 
Copenhagen. The industry prospered because the oil prices were rising fast again after the shock of 
2009. The societal and economic pressures aligned again in the fourth period beginning in 2014 
with an abrupt drop in oil prices and the global agreement on climate change adopted at COP21 in 
Paris. These pressures sent the industry into crisis the results of which are still to be determined. 
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Table 6. Periods of industry destabilisation. 
Period Societal pressure Economic pressure State of industry 
1995–2002 
climate change rises to 
the public agenda 
low oil price 
industry in crisis, Kiviter 
goes bankrupt and is 
recreated as VKG 
2003–2009 
climate change rises to 
the political agenda 
high oil price followed 
by the global financial 
crisis and an abrupt drop 
in oil price, expansion of 
renewable energy market 
niche 
industry prospers, minor 
crisis at the end of the 
period 
2010–2013 
the failure of COP15 is 
followed by a decreasing 
interest in climate change 
high oil price industry prospers 
2014–… 
the success of COP21 
leads to the pressure of 
implementing 
substantive policies 
abrupt drop in oil price 
industry in crisis, 






4.2. Results of the case study 
4.2.1. 1995–2002 
Table 7. Overview of the main events (1995-2002). 
External pressures 





1) several competing 
problem framings: 






decreasing oil shale 
reserves and the 




charges on the 
industry; 
3) Estonian Green 




1) new pollution and 
waste charges 
implemented;  
2) attempts are made 
at the privatization of 




3) Estonia achieves a 
temporary status for 
the oil shale industry 
from the EU as part of 
the unification 
negotiations  
1) heavy economic 
pressure hits the 
industry in 1998 as 
the oil price dropped 




2) first wind turbine 
mounted off the coast 
of Hiiumaa; 
3) Eesti Energia starts 
offering a domestic 
renewable electricity 
package to “green” 
consumers 
1) Kiviter goes 
bankrupt in 1999 and is 
recreated as VKG; 
2) diversification at 
VKG: producing oil 
from car tires, 
developing new fine 
chemical products; 
3) plans are made for 
renovating some of the 
old production facilities 
 
4.2.1.1. Activists and social movements 
In 1994, Estonia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, thus 
becoming a member of the countries dedicated to fighting against global warming. In 1995, the first 
Conference of Parties (COP) was held in Berlin and in the same year, Estonia had to present its first 
national climate report
5. “Climate change” first appears in the online newspaper archives in relation 
to the energy system in 1996
6
. The attention to climate change subsequently increased somewhat in 
1997 with the international adoption of the Kyoto protocol and again in 2002 when Estonia ratified 
it. With this step, Estonia took on the obligation to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% in 
the period from 1990 to 2012. However, this obligation did not place any significant pressure on the 
Estonian government and the oil shale industry. The reason for this was that after Estonia gained its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the transition to a market economy led to the closing 
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 Eesti rollist rahvusvahelises kliimamuutuste poliitikas 
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of many of the inefficient Soviet industries and production facilities. These changes already reduced 
the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50%. In spite of this though, Estonia still has 
one of the highest greenhouse gas emission rates per capita in the European Union (European 
Environment Agency 2016). 
From the beginning of the 1990s, several different and competing issue framings in addition to 
climate change can be distinguished (figure 8). Among them were concerns about energy security 
as well as the employment issues in the Ida-Virumaa region. In addition, there were ongoing 
debates specific to the particular period. For example, fears about the decreasing oil shale reserves 
gave rise to the debate about nuclear energy as a potential replacement for oil shale as the 
“national” energy source7. This idea was backed by some scientists like Endel Lippmaa and Anto 
Raukas. On the other hand, environmental activists and experts like Andres Tarand, Marek 
Strandberg and even the president-elect Arnold Rüütel were skeptical towards nuclear energy. They 
argued for the advantages of renewables and proposed a direction towards the decentralization of 
the energy system. They also pointed to the fact that Estonia lacks an official development plan for 




Figure 8. The importance of problems for different groups of actors in online newspaper articles of 
Delfi and Postimees between 1995 and 2016. 
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 “Kas toetate üleminekut tuumaenergiale?”. Delfi, 27.11.1997. 
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Furthermore, climate change was neither the only nor the most relevant environmental issue at the 
time as there were other more urgent concerns about the environmental impact of the industry. 
These included problems with air pollution, water contamination and industrial waste management. 
These concerns were the focal issues as environmental organizations like the Estonian Green 
Movement (EGM) and the Estonian Fund for Nature (EFN) started to make demands on the 
government to change the environmental charges of the oil shale industry
9
. Among the new charges 
planned were taxes on air pollution as well as the solid waste (spent shale) that was the by-product 
of the dry distillation process. Barely any attempts had been made at recycling the waste as spent 
shale was dumped around Kiviõli and Kohtla-Järve in big piles that eventually formed distinctive 
hills on the landscape of Ida-Virumaa. The problems with this solution were the contamination of 
groundwater, air pollution and the spontaneous combustion of the waste. 
4.2.1.2. Policymakers 
The industry was in a very difficult economic situation at the beginning of the 1990s due to the 
transition to a market economy and the government had thus made several exceptions to the 
industry which included applying pollution and waste charges that were 10 times smaller than the 
charges applied for similar toxic waste in other sectors. Due to the pressure by environmental 
organizations, an increase of pollution and waste charges was planned at the end of the 1990s. 
However, the low oil price and the Russian financial crisis did not allow for high tax rates to be 
introduced and the increase was not more than 5-20% annually
10
. 
The government was more occupied with other plans. As a heritage from the Soviet era, most of the 
companies in the oil shale industry like Eesti Energia and Kiviter were state-owned enterprises. In 
order to attract much-needed foreign investment for the renewal of the inefficient industry, the 
government drew up a plan of privatizing the oil shale enterprises. The first attempt at the 
privatization of Kiviter failed in 1996 as the government could not reach an agreement with the 
potential buyer over the conditions of the deal
11
. Conflicts arose over issues such as how the price 
of oil shale should be regulated, who bears the responsibility over the elimination of the 
consequences of past environmental damage and what will be the extent of future environmental 
taxes and charges. With the second attempt in 1997, a buyer was found when Eriõli bought 50% of 
                                                 
9
 “Eesti Roheline Liikumine soovitab karmistada keskkonnamakse”. Delfi, 28.03.2000. 
10
 Valdmaa, K. (2014). “Development of the environmental taxes and charges system in Estonia: international 
convergence mechanisms and local factors”. Policy Studies 35, pp. 339-356; “Saastetasud tõusevad järgmisel aastal 
keskmiselt viiendiku”. Postimees, 06.11.2001. 
11
 Põhijooni põlevkiviõlitööstuse arengust Eestis 
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the shares of the company. At the same time, serious interest was also shown by the Canadian 
company Suncor in investing in a new oil factory in Estonia. However, this deal was cancelled as 
concerns emerged over the liability and the environmental impact of the technological solutions 
after problems with a similar project by the same company in Australia
12
. There were also 
negotiations over the possible sale of Eesti Energia to the US-based NRG Energy. The negotiations 
lasted from 1995 to 2002 but ultimately ended in failure as disagreements between and within the 
government, industry and environmental organizations could not be solved by the final deadline of 
the deal
13
. The main arguments against the deal were fears that the foreign owners would not 
consider the strategic interests of the country such as strengthening energy independence and 
reducing environmental damage
14
. These arguments were presented not only by environmental 
organizations but also by the Minister of Economic Affairs Edgar Savisaar and even industry 
representatives themselves. The failure of the deal sparked debates about the strategic direction of 
the Estonian energy system. A coalition of environmental organizations called for drawing up long-
term national strategies for the energy system as well as the regional development of the Ida-
Virumaa region based on the internationally acknowledged principles of sustainable development. 
The Estonian Green Movement also presented the government with a new conception for the use of 
alternative energy sources until 2050
15
. At the same time, there were those who claimed that nuclear 
energy is the only way forward and that the establishment of a nuclear power plant in Estonia is just 
a matter of time
16
. 
Also on the agenda of the government were preparations for joining the European Union. With 
regard to the oil shale industry, the aim of the government was to achieve exceptions from meeting 
some of the conditions of the environmental directives of the EU which were necessary for the 
survival and further development of the industry. As a result of the negotiations, the European 
Commission agreed to give oil shale a temporary status, thus postponing the implementation of 
some relevant EU directives
17
. The special conditions guaranteed by the temporary status included 
1) a prolonged deadline until 2016 for the renovation of the old power plants to meet the air quality 
standards of the EU, 2) a prolonged deadline until 2013 for the transition to an open electricity 
market and 3) financial support for research and development of best available technologies for 
energy and shale oil production. 
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 “Läbirääkimised Suncoriga jätkuvad peale probleemide lahendamist Austraalias”. Delfi, 08.09.2000. 
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 “Eesti loobub Narva Elektrijaamade erastamise tehingust NRGga”. Postimees, 08.01.2002. 
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4.2.1.3. Consumers and suppliers 
With regard to economic pressure, the Russian financial crisis in 1998 together with an abrupt drop 
in the world crude oil price presented serious economic challenges for the industry. The changed 
market conditions proved to be too difficult to overcome for Kiviter which had just been bought by 
the private enterprise Eriõli. The company went bankrupt in 1999 and was subsequently recreated 
as Viru Keemia Grupp
18
. There were also some early developments in the use of renewable energy. 
In 1997, the first industrial 150 kW wind turbine was mounted off the coast of Hiiumaa and there 
were ongoing negotiations over the establishment of a wind farm with investment from Danish and 
German companies
19. There is also evidence of the emergence of a market niche for “green 
consumers” in 2000 as Eesti Energia, in cooperation with the Estonian Fund for Nature, started 




4.2.1.4. Industry strategies 
In the middle of the 1990s, the oil shale industry was grappling with severe problems the causes of 
which can be traced back to the Soviet period. The technologies used for oil and energy extraction 
were developed way before the 1990s and some even dated back to as far the 1930s
21
. In addition to 
inflicting serious damage to the environment, they were also economically inefficient. The industry 
was in need of huge investments but the financial assets were nowhere to be found as the 
enterprises were in large debt. The situation gradually improved by the end of the 1990s when the 
Russian financial crisis was over and the oil price on the world market started rising again. After the 
bankrupt of Kiviter in 1999, the new-born VKG focused on research into the best available 
technologies for oil extraction. As the investment capacity of VKG slightly increased in the 
beginning of the 2000s, the focus of was mainly on diversification activities such as producing 
motor fuels from old car tires as well as developing new fine chemical products
22
. Meanwhile, the 
state-owned Eesti Energia had already drawn up a plan by 1997 for partially replacing the old 
production facilities at the Eesti and Balti power plants that used the heavily contaminating 
pulverized fuel combustion technology with the new circulating fluidized bed combustion 
technology
23. The strategy was influenced by Estonia’s unification negotiations with the EU: 
although the oil shale industry was awarded a temporary status, the environmental directives of the 
EU forced the industry to renovate the old production facilities by 2016. Technological change was 
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also underway in Kunda Nordic Tsement as three of the old rotary kilns for cement production were 




Interestingly, the problem of climate change was never denied by industry representatives but by 
scientists like Endel Lippmaa and Anto Raukas. However, they were not in favour of oil shale as an 
energy source but instead supported the use of nuclear energy which was a popular opinion at the 
time
25
. There was some contestation to new environmental charges by the industry representatives 
but the arguments focused not on denying or downplaying the importance of environmental 
problems but on stressing the significance on social and political issues such as fears about the loss 
of energy security and independence and the looming problems of unemployment in Ida-Virumaa 




Table 9. Overview of the main events (2003-2009). 
External pressures 





1) nuclear energy 
debate grows; 
2) Ministry of 







3) the Green Energy 
Plan 2020 presented 
by the Estonian Fund 
for Nature; 
4) the Estonian Green 
Party created; 
5) climate change 
acknowledged as a 
serious global 
problem in public 
opinion 
1) ecological tax 
reform implemented; 
2) mining permits 




created for the energy 
sector and the 
utilization of oil shale; 
4) Minister of 
Economic Affairs 
denies climate change 
and requests free 
carbon credits for the 
oil share industry 
from the EU; 
5) renewable energy 
subsidies introduced; 
6) raise in 
environmental tax 
rates less than initially 
planned 




2001 and 2008; 
2) Eesti Energia 









 4) renewable 
energy market 
niche expands to 
25% of final 
consumption 
1) the raising of 
environmental charges 
opposed by Eesti Energia and 
the Federation of Estonian 
Chemical Industries; 
2) new environmental 
management systems 
implemented; 
3) Enefit and Petroter 
technologies developed and 
new oil factories established; 
4) sulphur treatment 
equipment installed; 
5) diversification targeted at 
the production of motor fuels 
and fine chemical products; 
6) Aulepa and Narva wind 
farms built and Iru power 
plant reconstructed; 
7) principles of sustainable 
development incorporated 
into the identity of the 
companies 
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4.2.2.1. Activists and social movements 
In the wake of Estonia’s unification with the EU, concerns emerged about the long-term future of 
the oil shale industry due to the new environmental directives. Again, the debate was mainly 
between the proponents and opponents of nuclear energy, a possibility that was seriously considered 
until the early 2010s. At first, the idea was to co-operate with the Lithuanians in the construction of 
the new nuclear power plant in Ignalina. However, in 2008, the scientist Anto Raukas created the 
non-profit organization MTÜ Eesti Tuumajaam which acted as a lobby group for the establishment 
of a nuclear power plant in Estonia. The organization even drew up a detailed step-by-step action 
plan of the preparations for building a nuclear plant
27
. The plan included hiring several nuclear 
experts at the Tallinn University of Technology and opening a new Master’s programme. The 




Environmental organizations like the Estonian Green Movement and the Estonian Fund for Nature 
were still opposed to nuclear energy. In 2006, a Green Energy Plan until 2020 was presented to the 
government by the Estonian Fund for Nature
29
. The plan proposed the transition to an energy 
system mostly based on renewable energy sources like wind and biofuels along with the 
decentralization of energy production. Another significant event was the establishment of the 
Estonian Green Party in 2006 by the climate activist Marek Strandberg
30
. In the 2007 election, the 
party went on to gain 6 seats in the parliament but was not included in the new government. 
However, the party developed into a strong advocacy organization for several environmental issues, 
including climate change.  
Meanwhile, policymakers were expected to take serious action on climate change already following 
the ratification of the Kyoto protocol in 2002 and the subsequent adoption of the National Program 
on the Reduction of Greenhouse Gases in 2004 which foresaw the decrease in emissions by another 
21% between 1999 and 2010
31
. The change of government in 2003 pleased environmental 
organizations because environmental policies were heavily featured in the new coalition agreement 
between Res Publica, the Reform Party and the People’s Union of Estonia. However, the actions did 
not live up to the rhetoric and in 2004, the Ministry of Economic Affairs received an official 
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“award” from the Estonian Green Movement for endangering the Earth’s climate32. The public 
acknowledgement of climate change as a serious environmental issue increased in 2005 when an 
unprecedented storm hit the city of Pärnu on the west coast of Estonia. The storm killed one person, 
injured many others and tore down several buildings. At the time of the 14
th
 meeting of the 
Conference of Parties in Poznan in 2008, the Estonian Green Party delivered another symbolic 
gesture by giving a small clock to the Estonian Minister of the Environment (figure 9)
33
. The clock 
was supposed to symbolize that the time for 
tackling climate change is running out and 
that a new international agreement for 
significantly reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions must be reached soon. However, an 
agreement was not reached in that year nor in 
the following one despite high expectations 
for the 2009 meeting in Copenhagen. Despite 
that, public opinion had been changed as 
climate change was now considered as the 




Figure 9. The Minister of Environment was presented 




In 2003, the idea about a possible ecological tax reform previously supported by environmental 
organizations was revived and plans were made under the leadership of the Minister of 
Environment Villu Reiljan to follow through on this idea. There were multiple reasons for this 
development, including the 1) forthcoming unification with the EU, 2) the governmental change 
after which the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment were governed by the same 
party as well as 3) the successful lobby of climate activists like Marek Strandberg from the Estonian 
Fund for Nature and Valdur Lahtvee from the Tallinn Department of the Stockholm Environment 
Institute
35. The reform was to be based on the principle of “polluter pays” which means that the 
party responsible for producing pollution is made responsible also for paying for the damage done 
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. In addition, an annual rise of some environmental charges like pollution 
charges was foreseen by the reform (figure 10). In 2005, the comprehensive “Environmental 
charges law” was adopted that included all the previous taxes and charges in a unified framework37. 
The new law did not bring about any fundamental changes in the general system of the charges that 
had been in place from the early 1990s. However, the charge rates were increased significantly and 
fewer exceptions were allowed for the oil shale industry. 
 
Figure 10. The collection of environmental taxes in Estonia from 2005 to 2015
38
. 
The rapid rise in oil prices beginning in 2003 led to a peculiar “gold rush”. Oil shale companies 
started expanding existing mines as well as applying for permits for opening new mines
39
. Among 
them were several new private enterprises such as Merko Kaevandused which was granted a mining 
permit in 2003. As all of the potential mining sites are situated in Ida-Virumaa (figure 11), the “gold 
rush” sparked heavy opposition from environmental organizations as well as local people and 
municipal authorities who were concerned about the deterioration of living conditions in the local 
municipalities and the damage to the natural environment in and around the mining area. 
Demonstrations were held in front of the government building at Toompea hill and Merko 
Kaevandused was sued by the Estonian Fund for Nature
40
. After meeting with the local people and 
authorities, the government decided to stop issuing mining permits to companies until a national 
development plan for the utilization of oil shale had been created
41
. The process did not go 
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smoothly, however, as the Ministry of Environment was soon after accused of drawing up the plan 
behind closed doors and failing to involve the relevant interest groups in the discussion. The issue 
garnered much public attention as an open letter to the government was signed in 2006 by several 
cultural opinion leaders in the Theatre NO99 who argued for a rapid decrease in the extraction of oil 
shale resources in order to save the environment
42
. The situation was compared to the so-called 
Phosphorite War
43
 in the late 1980s and a demand was made for a transition to a decentralized 
system based on renewable energy
44
. 
In 2008, a development plan was agreed upon which foresaw an annual limit of 20 mln tonnes for 
the extraction of oil shale
45
. The government saw this as a compromise because mining permits for 
over 23 mln tonnes had already been issued and altogether, permit requests had been made by 
companies for the extraction of up to 26 mln tonnes of oil shale annually
46
. However, the 20 mln 
tonnes limit was a significant increase when compared to the previous limit of 15 mln tonnes and 
the actual extraction capacities which 
were around 10 mln tonnes in the early 
2000s (figure 12). In addition, measures 
and incentives aimed at the development 
of more efficient and environmentally 
friendly technologies that were initially 
included in the development plan had 
been removed from the document 




Figure 11. The actual (dark brown) and potential (light 
brown) oil shale resources in Estonia
48
. 
However, not all local authorities were against the new development plan. In 2007, Voldemar 
Trumm, the mayor of Kiviõli, expressed serious concerns about the fact that the mines of Kiviõli 
Keemiatööstus were running out of oil shale and that new mining permits had not been issued. He 
claimed that if the government fails to agree upon the new development plan, it will lead the whole 
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city of Kiviõli into a “social catastrophe”49. The arguments of government officials were mainly led 
by concerns about energy security and independence. For example, the Minister of Environment 
Rein Randver said that oil shale is our “national wealth” and a guarantee of our energy 
independence
50
. Similarly, in a visit to the oil shale mines in Ida-Virumaa, president Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves said that oil shale is “a matter of our security and independence” and that miners are 
“the backbone of Ida-Virumaa”51. Interestingly, even the council of energy experts by the Estonian 
Academy of Sciences advised the government to raise the mining limit to more than 20 mln tonnes 
to cover the future energy needs of the country
52
. 
Meanwhile, work began on several documents that were to be united under the first comprehensive 
National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2020. These included the National 
Development Plan of the Electricity Sector until 2018, the Estonian Renewable Energy Action Plan 
until 2020, the Development Plan for the Utilization of Biomass and Bioenergy until 2013 and the 
Program on Energy Efficiency until 2013
53
. Several new measures were introduced with these plans 
for energy saving, the use of renewables, co-production of heat and power and more efficient 
utilization of oil shale. The 
development plans also 
prescribed the development of 
knowledge and legislation as a 
preparation for the potential 
establishment of a local nuclear 
power plant. However, rather 
moderate changes were foreseen 
with the development plans as the 
share of oil shale in energy 
production would drop to 70% 
and the share of renewables 
would rise to 8% by 2015
54
. 
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A significant event occurred in 2008 as the Minister of Economic Affairs Juhan Parts participated in 
an EU meeting in Brussels to discuss the EU climate and energy framework. At the meeting, the 
aim of the Estonian government was again to negotiate special conditions and exceptions from the 
EU directives for the oil shale industry. The specific demands were that the oil shale industry 
should continue to get free carbon credits (emission allowances) under the emissions trading 
system
56
. The emissions trading system which started in 2005 had previously allowed Estonian oil 
shale companies raise a significant amount of extra funds by selling their surplus carbon credits. 
The surplus of carbon credits was due to the fact that the base year for the reduction of carbon 
emissions according to the protocol was the year 1990 when Estonia was still part of the Soviet 
Union and thus had enormously high carbon emission rates. In an interview before the meeting, 
Juhan Parts made some statements that demonstrated the attitude of the Estonian government 
towards climate change, the oil shale industry and the energy sector. Among the statements were 
that 1) “oil shale is a gift from the God”, 2) “the CO2 emissions of the oil shale industry have no 
impact on the melting of ice on the North Pole” and that 3) “no one can force us to give up oil shale 
[because] there are no alternatives and it is a matter of national security”. 
In 2009, the government collaborated with the Green Party to implement another rapid twofold 
increase in environmental charges as part of the ecological tax reform
57
. This plan was greeted with 
heavy opposition from the oil shale industry as they were grappling with the economic difficulties 
caused by the global financial crisis. The dispute resulted in the implementation of lower tax rates 
than the ones that were initially planned. For example, the pollution charges that were supposed to 
be increased threefold were only raised by 20%
58
. 
4.2.2.3. Consumers and suppliers 
The main driver of economic growth for the oil shale industry was the world crude oil price which 
increased four times between 2001 and 2008. This led to a peculiar “gold rush” which included the 
expansion of mining areas as well as making plans for the building of new oil factories. The global 
financial crisis in 2009 subsequently led to an abrupt drop in the oil price which brought several 
development projects of the oil shale industry to a halt. 
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The overall share of renewable energy in final energy consumption increased from 16% in 2006 to 
over 25% in 2011. The developments in the renewable energy niche were mainly small-scale, 
including the establishment of new local combined heat and power stations, installing new solar 
panels and wind turbines and renovating hydropower stations. As a new development, attention was 
turned on energy efficiency as Eesti Energia opened a separate website for educating the public on 
the possibilities of energy saving in domestic households
59
. Perhaps the most significant event 
occurred in 2006 as the wind energy company Nelja Energia OÜ drew up an ambitious plan for 
building a wind farm off the coast of Hiiumaa that would have possibly been the biggest of its kind 
in the whole world
60
. The negotiations over the project are still ongoing as an agreement has not 
been reached between the company, the government and the local people. 
The development of the renewable energy sector was also supported by the government as the 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Action Plan, the Development Plan for the Utilization of 
Biomass and Bioenergy and the Program on Energy Efficiency resulted in some new legislation. 
These included the introduction of renewable energy subsidies in 2007 that enabled ongoing 
projects to be finished and new projects to be planned
61
. Interestingly enough, Priit Enok, the 
advisor to the Ministrer of Economic Affairs, used exactly the same arguments in support of 
renewable energy that were used for the protection of the oil shale industry. His statements included 
that 1) renewable energy was more efficient, 2) created new jobs and 3) a decentralized energy 
system based on renewables would mean higher energy security
62
. 
4.2.2.4. Industry strategies 
Estonia’s unification with the EU called for the urgent need for developing and implementing new 
technologies and production facilities that would meet the heightened environmental standards. 
Fortunately for the oil shale industry, the rapid increase in the world crude oil price meant that big 
investments could be made starting from the early 2000s into environmental innovation as well as 
diversification activities and the expansion of production. As the first step, the adoption of new 
environmental management systems based on the ISO 14000 and ISO 14001 standards was started 
in 2002 in Eesti Energia and VKG
63
. In 2004, energy production started in the first new facilities 
with the circulating fluidized bed combustion technology at the Narva and Balti power plants of 
Eesti Energia. In 2009, the old energy blocks using the pulverized fuel combustion technology were 
installed with new sulphur treatment equipment that would reduce the sulphur emissions of the 
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. At the same time, investments were made not only into energy but also oil production. 
These included diversification activities such as research and development into the production of 
shale-oil-based motor fuels as well as into the new oil production technology Enefit in cooperation 
with the foreign-based Outotec Technology
65
. The new technology was based on the principle of 
the full utilization of oil shale in a comprehensive technological process, including the recycling 
and use of all the by-products such as the surplus heat, gas and spent shale. The building of a new 
oil factory based on the Enefit280 technology in Jõhvi started in 2009. There were also other R&D 
projects that were carried out with foreign partners. These included exploring the possibilities of 
building a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania together with the other Baltic States as well as the 
possible establishment of an oil-shale-based oil factory in Jordan
66
.  
Investments were also made at Eesti Energia into renewables. In 2003, the reconstruction of the 
Ahtme power station was started with the aim to produce heat from biofuels. In 2004, following 
financial support from the EU, plans were made for building a new 39MW wind park on the ash 
fields near Narva and in 2005, the Tulevikuenergia Sihtkapital fund was established for financing 
future R&D into alternative energy technologies
67
. In 2007, the building of the biggest wind farm of 
the Baltic states was started in Aulepa and preparations were made for the building of a new waste-
to-energy unit at the Iru power station
68
.  
At VKG, the year 2005 marked the beginning of big investments into R&D. The investments were 
made mainly into new oil production technologies and facilities but significant efforts were also 
made for the utilization of the by-products of the oil production process such as the surplus gas for 
the production of heat and electricity
69
. The aim of the new Petroter technology was the full 
utilization of oil shale and its by-products similarly to the Enefit technology developed at Eesti 
Energia. The building of new oil factories based on the Petroter technology began in 2007 and the 
first of these was opened in 2009
70
. In 2006, the installation of new sulphur treatment equipment for 
the existing production facilities was set off and it was finished it 2008. With regard to 
diversification activities, the large-scale industrial production of fine chemical products began in 
2006 and in 2008, plans were drawn up for the development of a cement production technology 
with the aim to establish a cement industry based on the by-products of the oil production process
71
. 
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As the global financial crisis hit in 2009, several plans for environmental innovation as well as the 
establishment of the cement factory were put on hold but the building for the new Petroter oil 
factory continued. However, in the same year, the Estonian government granted VKG a financial 
support for developing a new technology for the production of shale-oil-based motor fuels
72
. 
There were also signs of the changing identity of the companies. In 2008, climate change was first 
mentioned in the annual report of Eesti Energia. The report said that “the assurance in the supply of 
different energy sources and their impact on climate change are the main factors that will shape 
future investments”.73 In 2010, a whole chapter of the annual report was dedicated to climate 
change mitigation. The chapter included the acknowledgement that “when talking about the 
environmental impact of energetics, the topic of climate change mitigation cannot be avoided. 
According to current understanding, humans affect the Earth’s climate by burning fossil fuels”74. 
However, the proposed solutions for reducing carbon emission were rather moderate, focusing on 
the implementation of the circulated fluidised bed combustion technologies and the partial use of 
biomass in the oil shale energy units
75
. The development of renewable energy technologies was 
mentioned vaguely. In 2009, in addition to the annual yearbook, VKG issued its first “Annual 
Report on Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development”. Although climate change was not 
mentioned in the document, the company emphasised the importance of environmental protection 
and the development of the local area
76
. Eesti Energia started issuing a similar report in 2012. The 
change of CEOs at Eesti Energia in 2014 also brought along a change in the mission of the 
company. However, no mention to alternative energy sources was made in the new mission of the 
national energy company which stated that “Eesti Energia is the world leader in oil shale energy”77.  
In 2009, the government collaborated with the Green Party to implement another rapid twofold 
increase in environmental charges as part of the ecological tax reform
78
. This plan was greeted with 
heavy opposition from the oil shale industry as they were grappling with the economic difficulties 
caused by the global financial crisis. Sandor Liive, the CEO of Eesti Energia, claimed that “if oil 
shale provides us with energy security, then it would be unwise to place high taxes on the oil shale 
industry”79. Instead, he argued for a tax reform that would make the charging of taxes from the oil 
shale industry depend on the world crude oil price. The contestation to the new policies also 
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involved the Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries (FECI) the criticism of which focused on 
the loss of up to 4000 jobs in the industry
80
. The action of the federation can be viewed as a 
manifestation of a closed industry front. The dispute resulted in the implementation of lower tax 
rates than the ones that were initially planned. For example, the pollution charges that were 




Table 10. Overview of the main events (2010-2013). 
External pressures 


















Energy 100% plan; 
3) the nuclear 
energy debate 
fades 
1) free carbon credits 
and other exceptions 
for the oil shale 
industry requested 
from the EU; 
2) new Auvere power 
plant established; 
3) oil shale mining 
limit not reduced in 
the new development 
plan; 
4) objectives of the 
previous development 
plan for oil shale 
utilization left 
unattained 
1) world crude oil 
price increases 
rapidly again in 2010 
and 2011; 
2) new wind farms 
built in Paldiski and 
Pakri; 
3) several other 
developments in the 
renewable energy 
sector put on hold 
because of 
legislative confusion 
1) new Auvere power plant 
established; 
2) four new oil factories 
opened; 
3) first new mine in 40 years 
opened in Ojamaa; 
4) new wind farms built in 
Narva, Paldiski and Pakri; 
5) new power plants based 
on biofuels or waste opened 
in Paide and Iru 
 
4.2.3.1. Activists and social movements 
Public attention to climate change decreased somewhat after the failure of the 15
th
 Conference of 
Parties in Copenhagen in 2009. However, environmental concerns related to the oil shale industry 
were still of high importance to environmental organizations. In 2010 as well as 2011, the Minister 
of Economic Affairs Juhan Parts was presented with a symbolic axe as an annual “award” for the 
most environmentally harmful deed. The axe was given to him by the Estonian Council of 
Environmental NGOs for systematically supporting the use of oil shale in favour of alternative 
energy sources. Upon receiving the award, Parts said that oil shale “is our gift, not our curse” and 
“it means energy security and […] that we will always have access to affordable electricity but also 
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jobs and possibilities for the export of technology”82. The year 2011 saw the creation of a new 
NGO, the Estonian Renewable Energy Council led by the young energy expert Rene Tammist. The 
new organization united some of the most important renewable energy entrepreneurs and 
associations and quickly assumed the role of an efficient advocacy group. In 2012, they came 
forward with a new plan called Renewable Energy 100%
83
. The plan proposed a transition to an 
energy system based on renewables only and included detailed analysis and steps for the transition 
to be implemented by 2030. The proposals were greeted by the chairman of the Estonian Green 
Party Aleksander Laane who said that “everything is ready for a renewable energy transition”84. 
At the same time, the dispute continued over the pros and cons of nuclear energy. Interestingly, the 
most active proponents of nuclear energy all had a scientific background but also shared skepticism 
towards climate change. In addition to the long-time supporters of nuclear energy Anto Raukas and 
Endel Lippmaa
85
, a fellow scientist Mihkel Veiderma of the Estonian Academy of Science claimed 
that “the impact of human activity on climate change is still a matter of dispute” and that “a large-
scale substitution of fossil fuels with renewables is not realistic”86. He also believed oil shale to be 
“a guarantee of energy security” and that the only viable option besides oil shale would be nuclear 




The topic of energy security was one of the most discussed issues in this period (see also sections 
4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.4) and there was confusion over the multiple meanings of the term. In 2012, the 
leader of the Social Democratic Party Sven Mikser published an article in which he differentiated 
between at least three different meanings of the notion. He claimed that “energy security” can mean 
1) that the consumer can be certain to always have access to energy, 2) that there is enough supply 
of affordable energy on the market and 3) that the organization of the energy system is 
environmentally sustainable and meets the public interests
88
.  He also added that the building of 
new oil shale based power plants “does not increase our energy security in any way”.  
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In the beginning of the 2010s, the Minister of Economic Affairs Juhan Parts was under fire for 
several decisions that had been made concerning the state-owned Eesti Energia. The criticism 
focused on state support for massive investments into oil shale development projects such as the 
renovation of old energy blocks at Eesti and Balti power stations and the building of new blocks as 
well as a new oil factory. At the same time, legislation was being drawn up in the Ministry for 
limiting renewable energy subsidies which resulted in the construction of new wind farms being put 
on hold
89
. In 2012, the leaders of several environmental organizations signed an open letter to Parts 
in which they expressed concerns over the growing environmental impact of the oil shale industry 
and accused the Minister of working against the EU energy and climate policy by subsidizing the 
use of oil shale
90
. They were joined in their criticism by the Minister of Environment Keit Pentus 
who did not approve of cutting renewable energy subsidies
91
. 
Despite heavy criticism, the government moved on with the plans of building a new power plant for 
Eesti Energia in the village of Auvere. The new 300 MW power plant which cost 638 mln € 
represented the all-time biggest investment in the Estonian economy. It was based on the circulating 
fluidized bed combustion technology that was also used in the renovated energy blocks at the Eesti 
and Balti power plants and allowed for the utilization of up to 50% of biomass in energy 
production
92
. The building of the Auvere power station began in 2012 and was partly financed by 
free carbon credits again requested from the EU that absolved the oil shale industry from the 
obligation of paying carbon emission charges
93
. The decision was seen to go against the 
government’s official strategy laid out in national development plans as well as the strategy of Eesti 
Energia. The official strategy aimed at a more efficient use of oil shale which meant focusing on oil 
instead of energy. Interestingly, in a comment in 2014 immediately before leaving office, the CEO 
of Eesti Energia Sandor Liive said that the construction of the Auvere power plant “was a political 
decision with the goal of increasing energy security but economically it was not a reasonable 
solution”94. This statement was in line with the words of Juhan Parts who said that the argument of 
energy security was “absolutely important” in making the decision95. The decision was opposed 
among others by the National Audit Office and the Social Democratic Party who compared the 
decision to “playing Russian roulette”, pointing out that it was based on inadequate economic 
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calculations and did not take into consideration the changing economic conditions resulting from 
the opening of the electricity market in 2013
96
. They also claimed that the argument of energy 
security amounts to nothing more than raising unaccounted fear towards Russia and that real energy 
security lies in good overseas connections and a decentralized energy system
97
. In 2014, however, 
the economic aspects proved to be decisive as Eesti Energia decided against the construction of a 
second 300 MW power plant that was also initially planned in Auvere.
98
 
In 2013, preparations started for a new national development plan for the utilization of oil shale. 
While the previous development plan foresaw a new mining limit of 15 mln tonnes by the year 
2015, the idea was dropped from the new plan and representatives of the industry as well as the 
Minister of Economic Affairs Juhan Parts even argued for raising the limits to more than 20 mln 
tonnes
99
. On the other hand, the Minister of Environment Keit Pentus did not approve of this and 
the annual limit remained at 20 mln tonnes in the new development plan
100
.  
While the government was busy with drawing up the new plan, the National Audit Office published 
an extremely critical report concerning the implementation of the previous national development 
plan. The report stated that all of the objectives of the previous development plan, including 1) 
guaranteeing energy security, 2) using oil shale resources more efficiently and 3) reducing the 
environmental impact of the industry were either inadequate in the changed market conditions or 
had not been attained by the respective deadlines
101
. In addition, the report said that 1) not enough 
research has been done into the environmental and social impacts of oil shale usage and that the 
current system of environmental charges and incentives does not motivate the oil shale industry to 
reduce environmental damage. A proposal was made for changing the system of charges in order to 
increase environmental protection and raise funds to the state’s budget102. The ideas were acted 
upon following the change of government in 2014. 
At the same time in 2013, the Estonian government representatives in Brussels again tried to 
negotiate exceptions from the EU for the oil shale industry. This time the matter was the Fuel 
Quality Directive which foresaw taxing of fuel production based on carbon emissions and would 
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have meant unfavourable conditions for shale-oil-based motor fuels
103
. However, 2013 was also the 
year when the industrial emissions law was adopted in the Estonian legislation. The law was based 
on the EU’s Industrial Emissions Directive agreed upon in 2010 and shifted the focus of 
investments into environmental innovation from the so-called end-of-pipe technologies towards 
cleaner production based on best available technologies (BAT)
104
. 
4.2.3.3. Consumers and suppliers 
After the shock of 2009, the word crude oil price increased rapidly again in 2010 and 2011. In the 
renewable energy sector, there was much confusion as the government could not agree on new 
legislation for renewables. Because of this, several development projects were put on hold
105
. This 
was also evidenced in the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption which rose by 
almost 10% between 2006 and 2011 but has not increased since then. 
There was positive news though as it was announced that Estonia had been the first country to meet 
the EU’s objective of 25% share of renewables in final energy consumption. The objective was 
reached way before the deadline in 2020. In addition, in 2013 Nelja Energia OÜ opened a new 40 
MW wind farm in Paldiski and a 6,9 MW wind farm in Ojaküla. Perhaps the biggest expansion in 
the renewable energy sector occured in the installation of solar panels which were mainly used by 
microproducers, e.g. domestic households.  
4.2.3.4. Industry strategies 
For Eesti Energia, the most important decision was of course the establishment of the Auvere power 
plant. In addition to this, the year 2012 saw the opening of the new oil factory based on the Enefit 
Technology
106
. In the same year, a public procurement was announced for the building of the first 
shale oil factory in Jordan and a building permit for the factory was granted in the following year. 
In 2014, the construction of the factory started in Jordan while plans for the building of a second 
power plant in Auvere were cancelled
107. This decision was in line with the company’s strategy 
which focused on oil instead of energy production. As for investments into environmental 
innovation, in 2013 new nitrogen capture systems were installed on production facilities and the 
installation of sulphur treatment equipment also continued
108
. With regard to renewable energy, the 
construction of the 39 MW Narva wind farm began in 2011 and new wind farms were also planned 
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in Paldiski and Pakri in cooperation with Nelja Energia OÜ. The developments were not limited to 
wind energy as in 2013, the construction of the first 77 MW waste-to-energy unit at the Iru power 
plant was finished and work was also underway for building a combined heat and power plant in 
Paide. In 2010, a heated discussion emerged over the decision by Eesti Energia to use woodchips 
for energy production in the renovated energy blocks at Balti and Eesti power plants which enabled 
up to 50% use of biofuels. While Eesti Energia tried to frame the decision as a step for the 
environment, energy experts from different backgrounds including Rene Tammist from the 
Renewable Energy Council claimed that “not every use of renewables is environmentally friendly” 
and that burning woodchips for energy production is also an extremely inefficient choice
109
. The 




At VKG, several projects for reducing the environmental impact were finished in 2010 and 2011. 
Among these was the reconstruction of the oil container park which included the installation of 
systems for the capture of greenhouse gases as well as the closing of landfills
111
. The carbon and 
sulphur emission rates of the company increased in 2010 though as a result of the opening of the 
new Petroter oil factory. However, lots of R&D was being done for the full utilization of oil shale 
and the recycling of the by-products and residues. In 2013, a new lime factory was established 
which used several by-products of the industry as an input in the lime production process
112
. The 
lime was used in turn in the sulphur 
treatment equipment. In addition, the 
residues of the mining process were 
used in road construction and 
comprehensive research was carried 
out into the possibilities of the 
utilization of spent shale and residual 
gas as well as the production of 
“green” fuels from biomass. 
Figure 13. Investments into environment by the oil shale 
 industry from 2011 to 2014
113
. 
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Direct investments into environmental innovation decreased significantly in early 2010s as most of 
the projects started since 2005 had been finished by now (figure 13). However, significant 
investments were made into new production facilities due to favourable market conditions. The 
building of the second Petroter oil factory started in 2012 and the third one in 2013. Another 
remarkable event was the opening of the Ojamaa mine in 2013 which was the first new oil shale 
mine opened in Estonia in the last 40 years
114
.  
Similar developments were underway at Kunda Nordic Tsement which saw a twofold increase in 
the use waste and biofuels in the production facilities. The co-processing of waste in the kilns 
enabled to rely less on fossil fuels and reduce the negative environmental impact of the cement 
production process. A decrease in carbon emissions was achieved by the implementation of a new 
dry clinker burning process and efforts were also made for the recycling of ash and dust resulting 
from the clinker burning
115. Things were not going so well at Kiviõli Keemiatööstus though. In 
2010, an official appeal signed by almost 700 people from the local area was sent to several EU 
institutions as well as international environmental organizations with the aim to stop the severe air 
pollution caused by the factories at Kiviõli116. Despite the appeal, the company continued the 
contamination
117
. In addition, another argument emerged with the local people when it turned out 
that the company was extracting oil shale from its mines despite a forbidding court order
118
. Some 
initiative was finally shown in 2011 when the decision was made for the construction of a new oil 
container park
119. After the company was acquired by the businessman Heiti Hääl in 2014, new 
funds were gained for investments into environment as well as the expansion of oil production
120
. 
4.2.4. 2014–…  
Table 11. Overview of the main events (2014-…). 
External pressures 





1) the impact of 
climate change 
heavily covered in 
the media; 
2) first-ever 
1) extra mining permits 
granted for the oil shale 
industry; 
2) new national 
development plan for the 
1) world crude 
oil price drops 
over two times 
between 2014 
and 2016 
1) additional sulphur and 
nitrogen capture systems 
installed on existing power 
plants; 
2) a campaign against 
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for action against 
climate change in 
Tallinn; 
3) “game over” 
predicted for the oil 
shale industry after 
the Paris agreement; 
4) Federation of 
Estonian Chemical 





harmful behaviour in 
2015 and 2016 
utilization of oil shale 
adopted at the time of 
COP21 that foresaw an 
annual mining capacity of 
20 mln tonnes for the next 
15 years and investments 
of 5,7 mln € into the oil 
shale industry; 
3) new national 
development plan for the 
energy economy adopted; 
4) “The Basis of Climate 
Policy until 2050” 
adopted; 
5) raise in environmental 
tax rates less than initially 
planned; 
6) tax rates subsequently 
reduced to the level of 
2009 on a temporal basis 
increasing environmental 
charges launched by the 
Federation of Estonian 
Chemical Industries; 
3) VKG temporarily stops 
the work of two old 
Kiviter oil factories and 
laid off 300 employees 
4) VKG re-hires laid off 
employees after extra 
mining permits are issued 
by the government; 
5) VKG, Eesti Energia and 
Kunda Nordic Tsement lay 
off around 750 employees 
again; 
6) VKG re-hires  
laid off employees again 
following tax reductions 
from the government 
 
4.2.4.1. Activists and social movements 
By the start of 2015, climate change had again gained top priority among the issues concerning the 
oil shale industry because of several national and global developments. On the national scale, the 
campaign “Our welfare lies in our national resources!” (see section 4.2.4.4) angered many 
environmental activists. As a result, the Council of Environmental NGOs gave the annual “award” 
for the most environmentally harmful deed to the Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries
121
. 
Elsewhere, preparations were being made for the 21
st
 Conference of the Parties in Paris. Because of 
this, climate change featured heavily in the media throughout the year and the daily newspaper Eesti 
Päevaleht featured a series of articles on the impact of climate change122. Among the people who 
turned public attention to climate change were activists Kaarel Tarand and Marek Stranderg, Raul 
Potisepp and Rene Tammist from the Renewable Energy Council and even Tarmo Soomere, the 
president of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. The prevailing opinion was that the success of the 
Paris meeting would mean that “the game is over” for the oil shale industry123. In addition, a public 
demonstration that demanded action against climate change was held for the first time in Estonia in 
November 2015 in Tallinn (figure 14)
124
. The event was organized by the Estonian Fund for Nature, 
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the Estonian Green Movement and Tallinn University. Speeches were made by the former Prime 
Minister and climate scientist Andres Tarand and Silvia Lotman from the Estonian Fund for Nature. 
Figure 14. A demonstration for the fight against climate change in Tallinn before COP21 in 2015
115
. 
Energy security continued to be an important issue. In 2014 and again in 2015, the Renewable 
Energy Council and the Estonian Green Movement organized a campaign called “Energy security? 
– Yes! With renewable energy we will be independent!”125 the aim of which was to renegotiate the 
meaning of the term “energy security” (figure 15). The organizers of the campaign stressed that 
importing fossil fuels is extremely expensive for EU countries and it supports the flourishing of 
undemocratic regimes. 
In 2016, a completely new problem was raised in relation to the oil shale industry as the Estonian 
Green Party started a petition for which signatures from over 1200 people were collected. The aim 
of the petition was to preserve the natural habitats of the flying squirrel, a rare and endangered 
species in Estonia
126
. The problem became evident after VKG and Kiviõli Keemiatööstus had put in 
requests for mining permits around Sonda which was also the place where the flying squirrels lived. 
The oil shale companies issued a response to the petition in which they stated that preserving the 
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Figure 15. A poster from the campaign “Energy security? – Yes! With renewable energy we will be 
independent!”116. 
4.2.4.2. Policymakers 
After the critical report by National Audit Office, in 2014 the government started planning an 
annual rise of environmental charges by 20%. This rate was proposed in an analysis by the Tallinn 
Department of the Stockholm Environment Institute. The plan was supported by the chairman of the 
Renewable Energy Council Rene Tammist who stated that taxpayers must be fully compensated for 
the use of national resources as well as the damage inflicted on the environment
128
 and by the 
Council of Environmental NGOs which claimed that the raising of environmental charges in 
unavoidable
129
. The plan was met by an unprecedented wave of contestation from the oil shale 
industry led by the Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries which launched a massive campaign 
called “Our welfare lies in our natural resources!”130 (see section 4.2.4.4). At the end of 2014, the 
Ministry of Environment surrendered to the lobby of the Federation of Estonian Chemical 
Industries as the new legislation prescribed an annual rise in tax rates by 3-6% for the next ten years 
instead of the initially planned 20%
131
. However, this was not enough for the oil shale industry as it 
was simultaneously grappling with problems caused by the falling world crude oil price. In 
November and December 2014, several hundred people in Kohtla-Järve became unemployed as 
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At the same time, the Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas participated in the opening ceremony 
of the new Petroter oil factory during which he said that the establishment of new oil factories is an 
extremely important step towards energy security and independence
133
. The opinion was shared by 
the CEO of Eesti Energia Sandor Liive who stated that “Estonia is a country of energy security”134. 
A few weeks later, another statement on oil shale was made by Taavi Rõivas. After a meeting in 
Brussels during which an agreement was reached on the new EU climate and energy policy 
framework, he stated that the decisions of the European Council “gave assurance for the further 
development of the oil shale sector [in order to] ensure energy security”135. A different point of 
view was presented again by the National Audit Office who published a report in which they 
claimed that there is a need for a comprehensive economic reform in the Ida-Virumaa region and 




The loss of jobs due to the closing of the two VKG factories at the end of 2014 caused panic in the 
government. In January 2015, a plan was made immediately for a tax reform proposed by the 
industry that would make the oil shale extraction charges depend on the world crude oil price
137
. At 
the same time, the Minister of Environment Mati Raidma said that the only solution to the problems 
of VKG is to raise the mining limits. The logic behind this proposal was that this way the company 
could extract more resources from its own mine instead of buying it from the mines of Eesti 
Energia. In June 2015, the government implemented an interesting change in legislation that 
allowed the oil shale industry to use up all of the mining capacities that had been previously left 
unused from the limit of 20 mln tonnes since 2009
138
. This meant that, for example, if the industry 
extracted only 15 mln tonnes of oil shale in 2010, it could now use up the 5 mln tonnes that was left 
unused that year. The chairman of the Estonian Green Party Aleksander Laane called this decision 
“a crime against the ecosystem”139. The decision was also opposed by the Council of Environmental 
NGOs who said that the mining capacities should be decisively reduced instead
140
. 
As the world crude oil price continued to drop in 2016, the government came up with another plan 
to save the oil shale industry. The idea of using wood chips for energy in the renovated blocks of 
Eesti Energia was revived and it sparked a heated argument again between environmental activists, 
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the government and the industry
141
. Hando Sutter, the new CEO of Eesti Energia claimed that the 
use of wood in power plants instead of oil shale has a positive impact on the environment and there 
is an abundance of old low-quality wood in Estonia that is suitable for these purposes
142
. On the 
other hand, Silvia Lotman from the Estonian Fund for Nature argued that this statement is not 
correct and that the massive burning of wood in power plants is not environmental protection
143
. 
While the government was planning several concessions for the oil shale industry, calls were being 
made by activists for the radical reform of Estonia’s energy system and the oil shale sector because 
of the oncoming 21
st
 Conference of the Parties in Paris. The necessity of new and decisive steps was 
also acknowledged by the government and in 2014 work began in the Ministry of Environment over 
a new strategy called “The Basis of Climate Policy until 2050”. The document was supposed to be 
not a sectoral development plan but one of the fundamental strategic documents of the state along 
with the sustainable development strategy and the international competitiveness strategy
144
. This 
was also the first time that the state had come up with a comprehensive strategy specifically focused 
on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Before that, the state had not implemented specific 
climate policies as these had been part of other environmental laws. The main objective declared in 
the new strategy was an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emission rates by 2050 compared to 
1990. Concerning the oil shale sector, the strategy foresaw raising the efficiency of the industry 
which meant focusing on oil production and stopping electricity production from oil shale by 2030. 
The 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was to be achieved by exporting oil which also 
meant exporting the emissions resulting from the use of shale oil to the importing countries. This 
strategy sparked criticism from environmental activists and even from the Government Office of 
Estonia which stated that “climate change is a global problem and therefore attention should be paid 
to emissions resulting from the products made in Estonia regardless of whether these products are 
consumed here or exported”145. At the same time, a new National Development Plan for the Energy 
Economy until 2030 was drawn up in the Ministry of Economic Affairs which set a goal of a 50% 
share of renewables in domestic electricity consumption by 2030
146
. The new plan was described as 
“moderate”, “unambitious” and “visionless” by energy experts147. 
Interestingly, in December 2015 in the very same week as the historic Paris agreement was reached, 
the Estonian parliament was discussing a new version of the national development plan for the 
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utilization of oil shale. According to the new development plan, the mining limit would remain at 
20 mln tonnes for the next 15 years and two new mines would be opened during that period
148
. The 
Minister of Environment Marko Pomerants, while acknowledging that Estonia will need to stop 
relying on oil shale, saw no chance of that happening in the next 15 years
149
. Prime Minister Taavi 
Rõivas, on the other hand, said that the government had already taken into consideration the 
consequences of the climate agreement before drawing up the development plan
150
. In 2016, a 
working group was assembled with the task to compile a report about the best available 
technologies (BAT) for the utilization of oil shale with maximal efficiency. The report was then to 
be used by the government to fight for new exceptions from the EU law for the oil shale industry
151
. 
Additionally, an implementation programme for the new development plan was agreed upon based 
on the report. The steps included investments by the state in the amount of 5,7 mln € for raising the 
efficiency of the oil shale sector
152
. 
4.2.4.3. Consumers and suppliers 
The world crude oil price fell almost two times from 2014 to 2015 and continued to drop in 2016. 
This caused serious economic difficulties for the oil shale industry as production in the facilities 
based on old technologies became economically infeasible. Developments in the renewable energy 
sector included growth in the installation of solar panels by micro-producers as well as the local 
development and production of technologies such as solar panels and wind turbines
153
. 
4.2.4.4. Industry strategies 
By 2014, the period of massive investment into environmental innovation was over for both Eesti 
Energia and VKG. Some new developments included the continuing installation of sulphur and 
nitrogen capture systems on the existing power plants. Additonally, there was a tight cooperation 
between different enterprises in the oil shale sector for the full utilization of residues and by-
products. For example, the residues of the oil production process were used in the kilns of Kunda 
Nordic Tsement for the burning of clinker
154
. 2015 also marked the end of the temporary status for 
the Estonian oil shale industry in the EU and from January 2016, all of the environmental directives 
of the EU were applied to the oil shale sector. As a result, two old energy blocks in the Balti power 
plant of Eesti Energia were closed as the renovation of them was not considered reasonable
155
. All 
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of the other blocks had been renovated and continued work. As for diversification, Eesti Energia 
started the production of fertilizers based on spent shale
156
. 
The plan of the government to increase environmental charges at the time of economic uncertainty 
was met by an unprecedented wave of contestation from the oil shale industry in 2014. The 
Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries which launched a massive campaign called “Our 
welfare lies in our natural resources!” the message of which was that the tax raises would lead to the 
bankruptcy of the whole industry (figure 16)
157
. As a result, 24 000 people in Ida-Virumaa would 
become unemployed, annual tax revenue in the amount of 250 mln € would be lost and Estonia 
would renounce its energy security and independence. In addition, the chairman of the federation 
Hallar Meybaum said that there were no alternatives to fossil fuels and that “stories about wood and 
wind as the basis of our energy system belong to the fairy tale genre”158. This statement was 
criticized by the Ministry of Environment, the Renewable Energy Council and the Council of 
Environmental NGOs who accused the federation of spreading false information and manipulating 
with the lawmakers and the public
159
. At the end of 2014, however, the Ministry of Environment 
surrendered to the lobby of the Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries as the new legislation 
prescribed an annual rise in tax rates by 3-6% for the next ten years instead of the initially planned 
20%. 
Figure 16. Posters from the campaign “Our welfare lies in our natural resources!”148. 
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At the same time, the industry was dealing with problems caused by the dropping world crude oil 
price. At the end of 2014, VKG announced the laying off of several hundred employees due to the 
closing of the old Kiviter oil factories. As the government responded quickly by raising mining 
limits, the factories were re-opened and people were re-hired
160
. Months later, the third new oil 
factory based on the Petroter technology was opened
161
. However, as the oil price continued to fall, 
in January 2016 VKG announced it had to lay off another 500 employees and that in these 
economic conditions, the company “could survive for no more than another 24 months”162. The 
economic downturn also brought difficulties for Eesti Energia who had to lay off about 250 miners 
and for Kunda Nordic Tsement as the closing of cement production at one of the two rotary kilns 
led to about 30 people losing their jobs
163
. In the Ministry of Economic Affairs, preparations 
continued for the legislation which would make the oil shale extraction charges depend on the 
world oil price. In addition, demands were made by industry representatives for a temporary 
reduction of all environmental charges
164
. The government reacted quickly again and arranged a 
symbolic meeting in March in the city of Narva where the ministers decided to reduce most of the 
environmental charges on the industry to the level of 2009 until the end of 2017
165
. The decision 
which saved 43 mln € for the sector was applauded by the industry but heavily criticized by others, 
including the Minister of Environment Marko Pomerants who pointed out that it means heavy cuts 
for the budget of the state-funded Environmental Investment Centre
166
. The Council of 
Environmental NGOs issued a statement in which they said that the abrupt reduction of 
environmental charges is against the law
167
. Moreover, Rene Tammist from the Renewable Energy 
Council claimed that the “favouring of oil shale production has become a norm in Estonia that the 
lawmakers are not willing to change even in a drastically changed economic situation”168. The 
journalist and energy expert Andrus Karnau commented that the oil shale industry is “just too big to 
let it go bankrupt”169. The Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries responded to these comments 
by saying that the state “needs to develop further that which has been accomplished and not destroy 
it”. The Federation also advised the environmental organizations “not to bite the hand that feeds”, 
referring to the fact that several NGOs are partly financed with the tax money collected from the oil 
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5. Analysis and discussion 
The analysis and discussion of the results in presented in this chapter. I start with pattern-matching 
the evidence with the theoretical mechanism of industry destabilisation (table 1) and then move on 
to explaining the outcome of the process by answering the research questions presented at the end 
of chapter 2. Based on the analysis, I summarize the conclusions from this case study for transition 
research and offer some policy recommendations for the sustainable development of the Estonian 
energy system and the oil shale industry. The chapter ends with limitations and possibilities for 
further research. 
5.1. Pattern matching 
I start the pattern-matching by comparing the overall pattern of events in the case with the model 
and then analyse the fit of each period in detail. The overall pattern of the process from 1995 to 
2016 partly fits with the five-phase model. The fit with the model is evidenced by the following 
trends: 
1. with regard to activism, the attention to climate change increases continuously (from a few 
activists to organized lobbying and demonstrations); 
2. with regard to policymakers, early concerns are followed by parliamentary debates 
(including the ratification of the Kyoto protocol) and the eventual introduction of new 
comprehensive political strategies (The Basis of Climate Policy until 2050); 
3. with regard to consumers and suppliers, early demand from “green” consumers leads to the 
expansion of the renewable energy market niche; 
4. with regard to the industry, there is evidence of both incremental innovation and investments 
into more radical solutions as well as the organization into a closed industry front and 
normative contestation and opposition to the new policies. 
There are also some significant deviations from the model. These include the following: 
1. climate change simultaneously competes with other relevant problems such as other 
environmental concerns, energy security and employment issues (figure 8); 
2. major economic pressure is inflicted not so much by the expansion of the renewable energy 
technologies niche as by the fluctuations in the world crude oil price; 
3. major political pressure is initiated at the global (UNFCCC, Kyoto protocol, Paris 
agreement) and international (EU climate and energy framework, EU carbon trading 
emissions system) level rather than the national level. Most importantly, the pressures on the 
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industry are mediated and neutralized by consistent support by the national government to 
the oil shale sector; 
4. the industry skips the first steps of denying or downplaying the issue and moves right into 
incremental innovation and diversification. However, radical change and re-orientation is 
mostly avoided because of continuing governmental support to the incumbent regime and 
the lack of an agreed-upon alternative political direction. Furthermore, periods of 
destabilising external pressure are followed by “golden eras” caused by the favourable 
economic conditions of the rising world crude oil price. 
Table 13. Actual pattern of events compared with the theoretical one for the first period (1995-2002). 
Phases 
External pressures 





Phase 1 x  
 
 
Phase 2  x x 
Phase 3 
 
x x  
Phase 4   x 
Phase 5   x 
When looking at each period in detail, the first period (1995-2002) fits with phases 1 and 2 to the 
extent that climate change is framed as a problem on the national scale after the Kyoto protocol is 
ratified by the parliament. However, there is also evidence of all the other periods (table 13). Early 
demand from “green” consumers leads to Eesti Energia establishing a renewable energy package 
for domestic households (phase 3). Interestingly, the industry skips the first steps of denying or 
downplaying the issue and moves right into 1) adopting incremental solutions by investing into 
renovating old production facilities (phase 2), 2) early diversification by producing fine chemicals 
and recycling old car tires for oil (phase 4) and 3) temporary dissolution following the bankruptcy 
of Kiviter (phase 5). The general note is thus that soon after the problem is framed, the strategies of 
policymakers, consumers and suppliers as well as the industry shift quickly into the next phases. 
Other deviations from the mechanism include action by government towards the privatization of 
state-owned oil shale companies as well as the negotiation of a temporary status for the industry 
from the EU. Two distinctive trends can be noticed that are characteristic of not only this period but 
the case study general: 1) there are several competing problem framings (other environmental 
concerns as well as energy security and employment issues) and therefore multiple “issue 
lifecycles” are simultaneously unfolding; 2) from the start, radical solutions to the problems (long-
term plans for a renewable energy transition) are proposed not by governments or industry 
representatives but environmental activists and advocacy organizations. 
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Phase 1   
 
 
Phase 2 x  x 
Phase 3 
x 
  x 
Phase 4 x x  
Phase 5    
The second period (2003-2009) partly fits with phases 2, 3 and 4 (table 14). With regard to 
activism, 1) several existing or newly-formed advocacy organizations (Estonian Green Movement, 
Estonian Fund for Nature, Estonian Green Party) become engaged in the fight for climate change, 
2) climate change enters the public opinion as a serious global environmental threat and 3) 
politicians are lobbied to take action on the issue (by delivering symbolic gestures and “awards”). 
Also in accordance with phase 2, the industry responds by forming a closed front (the Federation of 
Estonian Chemical Industries) while continuing with incremental changes (new environmental 
management systems, Enefit and Petroter technologies and end-of-pipe solutions like sulphur 
treatment equipment). However, there are also signs of investment into more radical innovation 
(phase 3) as far as a shift of focus towards the full utilization of oil shale and all its residues is 
concerned. Investments are also made into renewables by Eesti Energia (wind farms at Aulepa and 
Narva and the waste-to-energy unit at Iru power plant). Furthermore, there are some minor changes 
in the identities of the companies as they officially acknowledge climate change and embrace the 
principles of sustainable development. However, there are doubts as to whether these changes are 
substantial. Some new environmental policies are introduced by the government but there are 
significant differences between policymaking at the EU and national level as the implementation of 
the more radical EU directives is avoided or delayed due to the active support for the oil shale 
industry by the Estonian government. Moreover, free carbon credits are received from the EU for 
the oil shale industry as a result of negotiations led by the Minister of Economic Affairs who also 
denies climate change. The government also takes some steps towards renewables though as the 
introduction of renewable energy subsidies leads to a significant expansion of the renewable energy 
market niche (phase 4). Although advocacy groups come forward with another long-term strategy 





Table 15. Actual pattern of events compared with the theoretical one for the third period (2010-2013). 
Phases 
External pressures 





Phase 1   
 
 
Phase 2   x 
Phase 3 
x 
  x 
Phase 4    
Phase 5    
The third period (2010-2013) partly fits with phases 2 and 3 (table 15). As for activism, the 
environmental organizations regularly demand action against climate change from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Environment (by presenting symbolic gestures and 
“awards”). Additionally, a new organization (the Renewable Energy Council) is created that 
presents yet another long-term plan for a renewable energy transition. The industry continues with 
incremental solutions (phase 2) based on the rocketing world crude oil price. These include the 
establishment of several new oil factories and the Auvere power plant as well as the installation of 
end-of-pipe technologies like sulphur treatment equipment and nitrogen capture systems. These 
solutions are supported by government investments financed by another set of free carbon credits 
received from the EU. Eesti Energia also continues to invest into renewables (phase 3) as new wind 
farms are built to Paldiski and Pakri and a combined heat and power plant is opened in Paide. 
However, several other developments in the renewable energy sector are put on hold because of 
lacking policy support. In addition, the environmental objectives of the national development plan 
for oil shale utilization are left unattained. 
Table 16. Actual pattern of events compared with the theoretical one for the fourth period (2014-…). 
Phases 
External pressures 





Phase 1   
 
 
Phase 2    
Phase 3 
x 
   
Phase 4 x   
Phase 5 x  x 
The outcome of the fourth period (2014-…) is still undecided but there is strong evidence of phases 
4 and 5 (table 16). Ahead of COP21, decisive action against climate change is demanded in the 
media and even a demonstration is held in Tallinn. After the global Paris agreement is achieved, the 
government introduces a first comprehensive strategy on climate change mitigation (phase 4) as 
well as a new national development plan for the energy sector. Although these documents attract 
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criticism for being conservative and unambitious, the changed economic frame conditions that 
result from the increased tax rates and the plummeting world crude oil price push the industry into 
full destabilisation, including the closing of production facilities and a massive lay-off of employees 
(phase 5). Potential bankruptcy is avoided by quick reactive support from the government 
(additional mining permits and temporary tax reductions). At the same time, new development 
plans are agreed upon in which the oil shale mining capacity is still fixed at 20 mln tonnes per year 
until 2030 and massive additional investments into the oil shale industry are foreseen. This gives 
reason to think that the re-orientation of the industry is not to be expected soon.  
5.2. Explaining the outcome 
The outcome of the destabilisation process can now be explained by addressing the research 
questions of this thesis: 
1. In what ways is the Estonian oil shale industry embedded in the local landscape? 
2. What is the combined effect of external pressures and local embeddedness on the 
destabilisation of the Estonian oil shale industry from 1995 to 2016? 
With regard to the first question, there is significant evidence of societal, network and territorial 
embeddedness. The history of the long Soviet occupation during most of the 20
th
 century still bears 
an influence on Estonian politics and can be seen as a form of the societal embeddedness of 
economic activity. In the context of this study, this is most evident in the arguments surrounding 
energy security. While energy security was one of the most discussed issues over the period of the 
case, the meaning of the term was hardly ever disputed. “Energy security” almost always meant that 
all energy needs to be produced in Estonia and the reliance on import fuels is to be avoided. In this 
sense, the term is closely related to national independence and sovereignty which is an extremely 
important part of the Estonian culture. On the other hand, the few opponents to the predominant use 
of the term stressed that relying on this meaning of “energy security” amounts to nothing more than 
raising unaccounted fear towards Russia. Alternative meanings were proposed which associated 
energy security with renewable sources and decentralized production. Another serious concern 
related to the oil shale sector and the Soviet past is the issue of employment in the industrial Ida-
Virumaa region. In 2015, 13% of all the employed people in Ida-Virumaa were working in the oil 
shale industry. In addition, the industry created thousands of indirect jobs in related sectors such as 
catering, accommodation, transport and construction (KPMS 2015). Other job opportunities are not 
so easy to come by in the region as the unemployment rate (13,5%) is almost twice as the Estonian 
average (6,8%) (Statistikaamet 2016b). The importance of employment issues was exaggerated by 
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the fact that 66% of the population of Ida-Virumaa is of foreign (mainly Russian) origin. Hence, it 
is feared that a major loss of jobs in the oil shale industry would cause serious economic problems 
for these people and could even lead to a “social catastrophe”. 
The association of energy security with independence from foreign (Russian) energy can also be 
seen as a form of territorial embeddedness because 1) Estonia is situated next to Russia, 2) all the 
oil shale resources are found in north-eastern Estonia near the Russian border and 3) all the main 
power plants and oil factories are situated in the same region, i.e. the industry has been established 
historically around the same site. The social situation in Ida-Virumaa characterized by the large 
foreign population and high unemployment rate is another type of territorial embeddedness because 
employment issues have been an important argument for industry representatives, politicians and 









Figure 17. Combined effect of external pressures and local 
embeddedness on industry destabilsiation. 
Network embeddedness is manifested in the substantial political support over the years by the 
national government for the oil shale industry. Policymakers and industry representatives have often 
publicly prioritized the same issues and arguments, especially when facing normative contestation 
from environmental activists. Figure 8 shows that climate change and other environmental problems 
have been the most important issues for activists while industry representatives, on the other hand, 
have emphasised the importance of employment and energy security. Climate change has not been 
an important issue for either industry representatives or policymakers, with the latter being mainly 
concerned with other environmental problems, energy security and employment. The mutual 
relationships between policymakers and the industry have been evidenced most in their common 
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concern over energy security, with both sides using the same arguments on numerous occasions 
when facing external pressure (see sections 4.2.2.2, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.4.2). On the one hand, the strong 
links between the state-owned Eesti Energia and the government are obvious, with the Minister of 
Economic Affairs acting as the representative of the sole shareholder and the highest directing body 
of the company. However, the last few years have also seen increasing ties between the government 
and the privately owned VKG as their mutual concern over the turbulent employment situation in 
Ida-Virumaa have led the government to react quickly and implement substantive policy changes in 
support of the company. 
Table 17. Governmental support for the industry in each period. 
Period Pressures on the industry Governmental actions 
1995–2002 
1) Russian financial crisis; 
2) Kyoto protocol adopted; 
3) unification negotiations with 
the EU impose stricter 
environmental regulations 
1) raise in environmental tax rates less than 
initially planned; 
2) Estonia achieves a temporary status for the oil 
shale industry from the EU as part of the 
unification negotiations 
2003–2009 global financial crisis 
raise in environmental tax rates less than initially 
planned 
2010–2013 rising oil price 
free carbon credits requested from the EU and 
used for investment into new oil factories 
2014–… 
1) dropping oil price;  
2) Paris climate agreement 
1) raise in environmental tax rates less than 
initially planned; 
2) extra mining permits granted for the oil shale 
industry; 
3) tax rates reduced to the level of 2009 on a 
temporal basis 
With regard to the second question, the evidence suggests that the various forms of local 
embeddedness have an opposite effect to industry destabilisation (figure 17). This was evident on 
numerous occasions when the industry faced external pressures from the social and economic 
environments (see sections 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.4, 4.2.3.2, 4.2.4.2, 4.2.4.4.). At times of increased 
pressure, arguments about energy security and employment were the main factors influencing the 
decisions of the industry and the government. Perhaps the most significant finding still was the 
mismatch between international political strategies adopted in UNFCCC and EU agreements and 
the actions of the national government in implementing them (table 17). Ever since the Kyoto 
protocol, the Estonian government has met the minimum requirements for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and other measures of sustainability set forth in international legislation 
while at the same time constantly bargaining favourable exceptions for the oil shale industry. The 
disagreement with international conventions and standards was often explicit as the Estonian 
government held ongoing negotiations with the European Commission before and after joining the 
EU for special conditions for oil shale, including free credits from the carbon emissions trading 
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system that were used for investments into the oil shale sector. At other times, however, the 
government pursued actions that were seemingly in contradiction with international policies while 
rhetorically declaring support for them. For example, the adoption of the Paris agreement was 
publicly greeted by Estonian government officials. However, new national development plans based 
on oil shale were drawn up at the very same time because the government believed that the climate 
agreement supported the development of the oil shale industry. Moreover, governmental support 
has not always been strategic but rather reactive as indicated in the quick implementation of new 
favourable legislation for the industry during the last economic turbulence in 2015 and 2016. To 
sum up, all this implies that the network ties between the industry and policymakers have often 
proven to be crucial and have significantly altered the unfolding of industry destabilisation during 
times of heavy external pressure. 
5.3. Implications for the research on industry destabilisation 
With regard to the research on industry destabilisation, the aim of this thesis was to address two 
gaps in the existing literature: 1) why does industry destabilisation often unfold in a nonlinear way 
and 2) in what ways do local geographical features influence industry destabilisation? On the basis 
of this case study, we can now attempt to fill these gaps. 
Conclusion 1. The linear unfolding of destabilisation is altered by economic fluctuations and 
political support, not so much by environmental concerns. 
Concerning the first question, I found that there were mainly two factors that altered the linear 
sequence of the destabilisation phases: 1) economic fluctuations (caused by changes in the world 
crude oil price) and 2) political support for the industry. The economic advantages from the rising 
oil price between 2003 and 2008 and again between 2010 and 2013 neutralized the pressure from 
the renewable energy niche which also expanded substantially in the late 2000s. The advantages 
were amplified by governmental actions that offered additional funds and support for new oil 
factories while hindering the further development of the renewables niche by postponing new 
legislation. However, the industry crumbled fast as the oil price dropped abruptly in 2015 and full 
destabilisation and a potential bankruptcy was only avoided with the quick reaction of the 
government that significantly relieved the charges on the industry. Moreover, the bankruptcy of 
Kiviter in 1998 during the Russian financial crisis showed that without substantial political support, 
the capacity of the industry to survive through economically difficult periods is rather low. The 
findings thus confirm the suggestion by Turnheim (2012: 291-292, 307-308) that political support 
may have significant impact on the unfolding of industry destabilisation. 
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Conclusion 2. Industry actors and policymakers tend to form core alliances at the regime level. 
The reason for the political support for the industry was that there were strong network ties between 
industry representatives and policymakers. Government officials often justified the support for the 
industry by using the same arguments as industry representatives themselves, for example claims to 
energy security and employment. Furthermore, the government often revised its initial plans and 
responded reactively to the needs and pleas of the industry. This finding confirms the earlier 
hypothesis by Geels (2014b: 26) that industry actors and policymakers tend to form core alliances 
based on mutual dependencies that contribute to the lock-in of the incumbent regime. 
Conclusion 3. Industries are societally and territorially embedded in local landscapes. 
It is likely that the network ties between the industry and policymakers are in turn based on the fact 
that the industry is societally and territorially embedded in the local landscape. On the one hand, 
Estonia has a unique reserve of oil shale resources almost all of which is located in the Ida-Virumaa 
region and the industry has historically developed around the same site. On the other hand, the 
societal embeddedness can be traced back to the Soviet past and the unstable social and economic 
situation in the industrial Ida-Virumaa region which is still mostly foreign-populated and has a 
higher unemployment rate than in the rest of Estonia. Any kind of social or economic turbulence in 
the region is believed to pose a threat to our national independence and security due to the 
geographic position of Ida-Virumaa in north-eastern Estonia near the Russian border, hence the 
appeals for increasing energy security and employment rates. Societal embeddedness is also 
evidenced by the lack of alternative visions as a centralized energy system based on oil shale has 
been considered to be a guarantee for energy security by the industry as well as policymakers. This 
understanding has probably evolved through path-dependent processes that have been unfolding for 
almost a century and have resulted in the popular discourse that oil shale is our “national wealth” 
and that the unique competence in developing oil shale technologies gives Estonia a competitive 
advantage in the world market (Holmberg 2008). 
Conclusion 4. The full destabilisation of industries involves “disembedding” the industry from the 
local landscape. 
As industries are embedded in local landscapes, the full destabilisation of industries requires that 
the ties between the industry and the local landscape are “disembedded” and transformed. This does 
not just happen by itself but has to be strategically planned and coordinated by activists, 
policymakers and consumers and suppliers. Depending on the extent of external pressures, this 
process can lead to either the re-orientation of the incumbent industry or a transition towards 
sustainability of the whole national energy system. I suggest that when the number, intensity and 
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alignment of pressures is low or moderate, then the ties between the industry and the landscape are 
likely to be only partially broken and transformed and the industry will probably go down the re-
orientation path (figure 18). This means that the incumbent industry will hold its dominant position 
in the regime by orienting towards new markets. However, when the number, intensity and 
alignment or pressures is high, then the ties between the industry and the local landscape are likely 
to be fully broken and transformed and the industry will probably dissolve and be replaced by an 
alternative technology niche that represents a completely new industry. The latter pathway can be 
seen as a system-level transition as the incumbent industry loses its position and the whole industry 
regime is reconfigured (figure 19).  
 










Figure 19. System transition. 
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Conclusion 5. The alignment of problems and solutions presents opportunities for radical change 
but political action is also needed. 
One way of breaking and transforming the ties between the industry and the local landscape is 
developing alternative solutions to the existing problems. These might have to do with new 
technologies but also with discourses and visions. An interesting finding was that on numerous 
occasions over the years, activists presented the government with a comprehensive alternative 
strategy for the long-term development of the energy sector based on renewable energy (see 
sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.1). However, there was little response from the government and the 
rest of society and the options were never seriously considered. Another significant development 
was the creation of the Renewable Energy Council which acted as a successful link between 
activists and renewable energy entrepreneurs, adopting both advocacy tasks as well as providing 
support for technological development. The creation of the organization was important for bringing 
about the shift of emphasis from problems to solutions and increasing the alignment of pressures on 
the industry. This also confirms the suggestion by Geels and Penna (2015: 81) that in the later 
stages of destabilisation, the problems are increasingly replaced by opportunities for alternative 
development paths. 
Conclusion 6. Introducing new ways to frame familiar problems might lead to radical change. 
Another way of transforming the discursive landscape is to introduce alternative interpretations of 
familiar issues. This case study showed that in addition to climate change, several different issues 
like energy security, employment and other environmental problems simultaneously competed for 
public and political attention. As energy security and employment proved to be more important than 
climate change, alternative framings could be used as a discursive tool to fight the industry and 
policymakers “with their own weapons”. This would include attempts at introducing new meanings 
to these issues that would open people’s minds towards envisioning alternative futures. An attempt 
at this was made in 2014 and 2015 when the Renewable Energy Council and the Estonian Green 
Movement launched a campaign in which they tried to re-interpret the meaning of “energy 
security”, claiming that real energy security lied in renewable energy and decentralized production. 
This kind of alternative framings could help garner wider democratic support and initiate large-
scale demands for change from the civil society without which the government is unlikely to 
consider new radical solutions. This would again confirm the finding by Geels and Penna (2015: 
81) that patterns of destabilisation can be altered by changes in the meaning of issues. 
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Conclusion 7. Symbolic changes in mission and identity might be easier than radical changes in 
technologies. 
The last finding of this study contradicts the earlier finding of Turnheim and Geels (2013: 1765) 
that the mission and identity of industries exhibit the highest degree of lock-in and are least 
susceptible to change. This case study showed that most of the companies, including Eesti Energia, 
VKG and Kunda Nordic Tsement willingly incorporated elements of corporate social responsibility 
and sustainable development into their identities and strategies while at the same time expanding oil 
shale usage and adopting only incremental changes in technologies. This suggests that it is 
relatively easy for companies to make rhetorical and symbolic changes in their identity but these 
might amount to little more than “greenwashing” if not followed by radical changes in technologies. 
5.4. Policy recommendations 
Systemic and strategic policymaking in the 21
st
 century means finding the right balance between the 
social, economic and environmental dimension of sustainable development. To date, it has not been 
easy for the Estonian government to balance these aspects. This is because radical political changes 
involving the possible dissolution of existing industries are obviously extremely difficult for those 
making the decisions as well as for the people related to the industry who suffer the consequences 
of these decisions. Based on this case study, I suggest some basic steps for developing sustainable 
climate and energy policies in Estonia. 
Recommendation 1. Make use of the “perfect storm” created by the alignment of pressures. 
Previous research has shown that governments are well-advised to make use of “perfect storms” 
where pressures on multiple dimensions become aligned in the same direction (Turnheim 2012: 
294). This kind of situation can also be seen as a “window of opportunity” that presents favourable 
conditions for new radical solutions to break through to the incumbent regime (Geels 2005). 
Evidence suggests that we are experiencing a similar situation now. From the end of 2014 until 
now, we have seen a remarkable fall in the world crude oil price, the adoption of the Paris 
agreement on climate change and a rapid increase in the competitiveness of renewable energy 
technologies. All these developments present very serious challenges for the oil shale industry and 
pose questions about whether and for how long the industry is able to survive. This suggests that 





Recommendation 2. Introduce alternative interpretations of the meaning of energy security and the 
economic prosperity of Ida-Virumaa. 
Radical policy changes need large-scale democratic support and therefore require people to imagine 
alternative possibilities and adopt new beliefs and mindsets. As energy security and employment 
issues have proven to be the main arguments against environmental protection and radical 
innovation, it is necessary to introduce new interpretations to these issues that would open people’s 
minds towards envisioning alternative futures. This would include considering whether energy 
security could be enhanced by a decentralized energy system based on renewables and whether 
employment rates in Ida-Virumaa could be increased by a renewable energy industry that would 
create thousands of new and clean jobs in the region. Moreover, the entrenched image of Ida-
Virumaa as “oil shale land” would need to be re-envisioned. For example, the long coastal line of 
the region could very well form a basis for the image of Ida-Virumaa as the “wind land”, thus 
drawing associations to wind energy. 
Recommendation 3. Revise relevant national development plans to make them compatible with 
long-term global goals on climate change. 
The current national development plans for the energy economy and for the utilization of oil shale 
apply until 2030. However, national and international strategies on climate change foresee actions 
until 2050. While the national development plans acknowledge the need for a significant decrease 
in oil shale usage after 2030, no plans have been made on how this would work out in reality. Since 
the reorientation or collapse or old industries is a long and very difficult process, strategies for the 
radical transformation of the energy system and the oil shale industry need to be developed as soon 
as possible in order to follow through on the promises. 
Recommendation 4. Draw up a comprehensive strategy for the long-term development of Ida-
Virumaa based on the principles of sustainable development. 
The radical transformation of the oil shale industry would probably present serious problems for the 
people of Ida-Virumaa. Therefore, a long-term strategy for the development of the region is needed 
that would attend to the social, economic and environmental needs of region. This would include 
support for the development of new clean industries as well as extensive retraining programmes for 
former employees of the oil shale industry and social protection for the people unable to find a new 
job. Since the industry regime is a semi-coherent structure, it might be easier for some companies to 
adjust to the changes than for others. For the companies in the energy industry, it might be 
relatively easy to reorient towards renewable energy but the situation might become very difficult 
for the companies relying completely on oil shale. For the latter, survival in the conditions of 
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increasingly stricter climate and energy policies would mean a move away from the energy sector 
and a substantial re-orientation towards the production of fine chemicals products. In the energy 
sector, support for the development of new industries is also crucial. 
5.5. Limitations and possibilities for further research 
There are some important limitations about the conclusions of this study. Firstly, the conclusions 
apply first and foremost to the energy industry. In Estonia as well as in numerous other countries, 
national energy systems are often highly centralized and dominated by big state-owned corporations 
which might make it more likely that core alliances are formed between the companies and 
policymakers. However, the conclusions might not apply to other sectors that are not dominated by 
state-owned enterprises or the protection of which is not of crucial national importance. Secondly, 
the specific conclusions apply mainly to Eastern European countries with a similar past of Soviet 
occupation as Estonia. For example, claims for energy security and independence might not be so 
dominant in Western states. However, the overall model of the contrary effects of external pressures 
and local embeddedness is expected to be generally applicable. 
Further research could explore more in-depth the evolution of different framings and interpretations 
of disputable issues like energy security and how the changes in framings influence the unfolding of 
industry destabilisation. Also, further empirical examination is needed into the different ways that 
industries are locally embedded, including theoretical clarification of different ways of 
“disembedding” industries from local landscapes. Another possibility to build on existing models of 
industry destabilisation is to distinguish between the influence of external pressures on the national 
and international level. This is a promising avenue of future research as the case study showed that 
there can be major differences in the ways that international polciies are adopted on the national 
level. Moreover, there is an abundance of literature on multi-level environmental governance that 
could offer fruitful insights for industry destabilisation (e.g. Fairbass and Jordan 2004; Jordan 
2000). Finally, empirical evidence is also needed about positive examples of how the co-operation 
between activists, consumers and suppliers and policymakers can enhance the development of clean 
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Appendix A. Operational definitions of the mechanism 
Phases 
Activists and social 
movements 
Policymakers Consumers and suppliers Industry regime 
Phase 1 
activists frame climate change 
as an issue 
 
 
firms downplay the seriousness of climate 
change as an issue 
Phase 2 
1) an organization or 
movement is created to raise 
awareness about climate 
change, 
 2) climate change enters the 
public opinion 
1) some politicians enter the 
public debate, 
2) an informal committee is 
created to discuss the issue of 
climate change 
1) firms organize into a closed industry front, 
2) firms defend the domain by publicly 
contesting the claims of climate activists, 
3) firms develop and adopt incremental 
technologies 
Phase 3 
1) debates about the framing of 
the issue continue, 
2) politicians are being lobbied 
by climate activists to take 
action on climate change 
formal hearings or debates 
about climate change are 
held in the parliament 
early demand by renewable 
energy consumers 
1) firms portray renewable energy technologies 
as unfeasible, 




radical new climate policies 
a renewable energy market 
niche is established 
1) firms publicly oppose new climate policies,  
2) firms diversify into new product markets 
Phase 5 
new policies change the 
economic frame conditions 
for the industry 
mainstream preferences 
change towards renewable 
energy consumption 
firms make substantial changes in 1) 
technologies and regulations or  





Appendix B. Coding manual of the content analysis 





A4 Whose views are mainly represented in the article? 
 1 Journalist 
 2 Environmental activist 
3 Politician or government official 
4 Industry representative 




2. Categories and codes of deductive (theory-based) coding 
B1 Activists and social movements 
1 Climate change is mentioned as an issue 
2 An organization or movement concerned with climate change is mentioned 
 3 Public opinion towards climate change is mentioned 
4 New climate policies are advocated 
5 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B2 Policymakers 
1 The creation of an informal committee concerned with climate change is mentioned 
2 Formal hearings in the parliament about climate change are mentioned  
3 New climate policies are mentioned 
4 Changes in economic frame conditions are mentioned 
 5 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B3 Consumers and suppliers 
 1 Rising renewable energy demand is mentioned 
2 A renewable energy market niche is mentioned 
 3 Changes in mainstream preferences of energy use are mentioned 
4 None of the above are mentioned 
 
B4 Industry strategies 
 1 Climate change is denied 
2 The seriousness of climate change is downplayed 
 3 A closed industry front is mentioned 
4 The claims of climate activists are contested 
5 An incremental technological solution by a firm in the oil shale industry is 
mentioned 
6 Renewable energy technologies are portrayed as unfeasible 
7 Investment into renewable energy by a firm in the oil shale industry is mentioned 
8 New climate policies are opposed 
84 
 
9 Diversification by a firm in the oil shale industry into new product markets is 
mentioned 
10 Substantial technological or regulative changes by a firm in the oil shale industry 
are mentioned 
11 Substantial changes in the mission or identity of a firm in the oil shale industry are 
mentioned 
12 The bankruptcy of a firm in the oil shale industry is mentioned 
 13 None of the above are mentioned 
 
3. Categories and codes induced from open coding 
C1 Alternative issue framings 
 1 Energy security 
2 Unemployment 
3 Low oil price 
4 Tax revenue from the oil shale industry 
5 Oil shale as the national wealth 
6 Environmental damage (other than climate change) 
7 Hidden subsidies for the oil shale industry 
8 Decreasing oil shale reserves 
9 Inefficiency of oil shale as an energy source 
10 Natural habitats of the flying squirrel 
11 None of the above are mentioned 
 
C2 Alternative policies proposed and /or implemented 
 1 Decentralisation of energy production 
2 Limiting the oil shale mining capacity 
3 Renewable energy subsidies 
4 Privatisation of energy companies 
5 Temporary status for oil shale industry by the EU 
6 Temporary reduction of environmental taxes for the oil shale industry 
7 None of the above are mentioned 
 





5 Other biofuels (including waste) 
6 Renewable energy sources in general 
 7 All alternatives depicted as infeasible 
8 None of the above are mentioned 
 
C4 Alternative industry strategies 
 1 Opening a new oil shale mine 
 2 Establishing a new power plant 
3 Establishing a new oil factory 
4 Cutting costs by laying off employees 






Appendix C. Results of the content analysis 
 
Figure XXX. Results of deductive coding (1995-2002). 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16. Results of deductive coding (2003-2009). 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 22. Results of deductive coding (2010-2013). 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 27. Results of deductive coding (2014–…). 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D. List of online newspaper items 
Date Publisher Headline Reference 
17.01.1996 Delfi 










11.06.1996 Delfi Kiviter otsib investoreid http://arileht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/kiviter-otsib-investoreid?id=50727402  
24.07.1996 Postimees 
Rajatav lõhkeainetehas 







Eesti Energia teeb venelastele 




Eesti Energia erastamise kava 






Ida-Viru suurfirma ootab 
miljardit 
http://arileht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/ida-viru-suurfirma-ootab-miljardit?id=50729946  
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Eesti Energia teenis 2,7 

















































































ETV: kvoodikärbe ähvardab 
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Liive: elektrijaamad võivad 
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Kadri Paas: Ütle, kui palju sa 





Looduse fondi juht: Eesti 
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VKG plaanib teise õlitehase 







































Valitsusjuhi meelest survestab 














Juhtkiri: keskkonna pingpong 
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Rene Tammist: taastuvenergia 
osakaalu tõusu serveeritakse 
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Eesti Energia võttis 
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Andrus Ansip: anname 





Rohelise elektri toetus on elu 









Uus elektrijaam kerkib 










Liive: põlevkivijaamast tuleb 


















Timo Tatar: põlevkivielektrit 






Euroopa Komisjon kinkis 
Eesti Energiale õiguse üle 300 















Tiit Kolk: riiklik eksperiment 
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Riigikontroll: Parts võiks 
piinlikku olukorda sattumise 
vältimiseks riigikontrolli 





ehitamisest: meil on uusi 























Juhan Parts: 50 aastat vana 



















100% taastuvenergiat: käsi 





Eesti Energia õlitehas tootis 
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projektidele kriipsu peale 
tõmmata 
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Põlevkivitööstus VKG võtab 











Eurotoetuse abil sai ühest 
Kiviõli poolkoksiprügilast 



























VKG astus diislikütuse 
tootmisele sammu lähemale 
http://pluss.postimees.ee/2753000/vkg-astus-diislikutuse-tootmisele-sammu-
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Keemiatööstuse liidu juht 
vastuseks keskkonnaministri 
tööstuste kriitikale: riik ei 





Taastuvenergia Koda: kas 












Eesti 2050. aastaks 
põlevkivielektrist vabaks ja 




Keskkonnatasu tõus võib 
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Liit keskkonnatasudest: must 
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tõttu Ida-Virumaa töökohad 




















































Kommiraha: VKG mahtude 
juures kasvaksid 

















Sõerd: riik ei pea kohe 
vananenud tehnoloogia tõttu 

















Valitsus hakkab arutama 
põlevkiviõlitootjate maksude 




VKG koondab mitusada 





Riik kavatseb VKG 
koondamiste tõttu kiiresti 




Koondava VKG juht: oma 
kaevanduse põlevkiviga 































Eesti Energia uus juht: 51 
miljonit eurot neelanud Utah’ 
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Michal: põlevkivi võiks 
kaevandada endiselt 20 

































Riigikogu võttis vastu 
põlevkivi tagantjärgi 









mõju: pool aastat tagasi 














Jõhvi volikogu astus Kose 










Hando Sutter: energeetikas on 
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Michal VKG koondamisest: 






Valitsus tahab taas lubada 





VKG suuromanik pärast 500 
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VKG soovib ressursi- ja 
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Eesti Energia: valitsuse otsus 
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Eesti Energia hakkab 























Eesti pani paika 
kliimapoliitika: põlevkivi 





Eesti Energia suurendab kuni 











Andrus Karnau: Eesti Energia 





Viru Keemia Grupp võtab 
















Eesti Energia kulutab Utah’s 
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Globaalne kliimamuutus kujutab tõsist ohtu tänapäeva ühiskonnakorralduse 
jätkusuutlikkusele ning selle negatiivsete mõjude ärahoidmine või leevendamine nõuab 
otsustavat sekkumist. Ühelt poolt on tegu tehnoloogiaküsimusega, kuna suur osa vastutusest 
lasub mittejätkusuutlikel tööstusharudel, mis põhinevad fossiilkütuste kasutamisel. Samas 
hõlmab keskkonnaprobleemide lahendamine ka radikaalseid ühiskondlikke muutusi 
probleemi teadvustamises, poliitilistes eesmärkide seadmises ja regulatsioonide rakendamises, 
tarbijakäitumises ning kultuurilistes arusaamades ja väärtustes. 
Käesolevas magistritöös pealkirjaga “Mis takistab energiasiirdeid? Kliimamuutuse mõju Eesti 
põlevkivitööstuse destabiliseerumisele” uuritakse seoseid kliimamuutuse poolt põhjustatud 
sotsiaalse, poliitilise ja majandusliku surve ning Eesti põlevkivitööstuse muutumise vahel 
aastatel 1995-2016. Varasemad teadustööd on leidnud, et välissurve suurenemine viib 
reeglina tööstuse destabiliseerumiseni, mis toob kaasa radikaalsed muutused nagu 
ümberorienteerumine uutele turgudele või traditsiooniliste tööstuse asendumine uue ja 
innovatiivse tööstusharuga. Eesti põlevkivitööstuse juhtum võimaldab uurida tähelepanuta 
jäänud küsimust, mil määral mängib selles protsessis rolli kohalik geograafiline kontekst. Töö 
eesmärgiks on seega vastata kahele peamisele uurimisküsimusele: 
1. millistel viisidel on Eesti põlevkivitööstus seotud kohaliku piirkonnaga? 
2. milline on kliimamuutuse poolt põhjustatud välissurve ja kohaliku piirkonna 
koosmõju põlevkivitööstuse destabiliseerumisele aastatel 1995-2016? 
Uurimisküsimustele vastamiseks on läbi viidud kvalitatiivne juhtumiuuring, mis põhineb 
järgmistel allikmaterjalidel: a) suuremate päevalehtede veebiarhiivid (Delfi ja Postimees),  
b) avalikud dokumendid (ettevõtete aastaraamatud ja -aruanded, riiklikud arengukavad),  
c) sekundaarkirjandus, d) statistikaandmebaasid. Töö tulemustest selgub, et kliimamuutuse 
mõju põlevkivitööstuse destabiliseerumisele on takistanud 1) tööstuse sotsiaalne ja 
territoriaalne seotus Ida-Virumaa piirkonnaga, mistõttu energiajulgeoleku ja tööhõive 
küsimused on olnud prioriteetsemad kui keskkonnaprobleemid ja 2) sidemed tööstuse ja 
poliitikute vahel, mis väljenduvad regulaarselt tööstuse huvides olevate poliitikate 
vastuvõtmises. Juhtumiuuringu alusel võib järeldada, et jätkusuutliku arengu saavutamine 
eeldab muu hulgas tööstuse ja kohaliku piirkonna vaheliste sidemete ümberkujundamist, mis 
on aluseks nii töösturite ja poliitikute kui ka laiema avalikkuse ühisele arusaamale tööstuse 
piirkondlikust rollist. Selleks on mitmeid viise, alates laiapõhjalise diskussiooni algatamisest 
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selliste probleemide tähenduste üle, mida oleme seni võtnud iseenesestmõistetavalt (näiteks 
energiajulgeolek) ning lõpetades nii riiklike kui ka regionaalsete arengukavade põhjaliku 
ümbervaatamisega. Teoreetiliselt on aeg selleks küps just nüüd, kuna Pariisi kliimakokkulepe, 
toornafta hinna langus maailmaturul ja taastuvenergiatehnoloogiate konkurentsivõime kasv 
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